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About RESPOND 
RESPOND: Multilevel Governance of Mass Migration in Europe and Beyond is a 
comprehensive study of responses to the 2015 Refugee Crisis. One of the most visible 
impacts of the refugee crisis is the polarization of politics in EU Member States and intra-
Member State policy incoherence in responding to the crisis. Incoherence stems from diverse 
constitutional structures, legal provisions, economic conditions, public policies and cultural 
norms, and more research is needed to determine how to mitigate conflicting needs and 
objectives. With the goal of enhancing the governance capacity and policy coherence of the 
European Union (EU), its Member States and neighbours, RESPOND brings together fourteen 
partners from eleven countries and several different disciplines. In particular, the project aims 
to: 
• provide an in-depth understanding of the governance of recent mass migration at 
macro, meso and micro levels through cross-country comparative research. 
• critically analyse governance practices with the aim of enhancing the migration 
governance capacity and policy coherence of the EU, its member states and third 
countries. 
The countries selected for the study are Austria, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iraq, Italy, 
Lebanon, Poland, Sweden, Turkey and the United Kingdom. By focusing on these countries, 
RESPOND studies migration governance along five thematic fields: (1) Border management 
and migration control, (2) Refugee protection regimes, (3) Reception policies, (4) Integration 
policies, and (5) Conflicting Europeanization. These fields literally represent refugees’ 
journeys across borders, from their confrontations with protection policies, to their travels 
through reception centres, and in some cases, ending with their integration into new societies. 
To explore all of these dimensions, RESPOND employs a truly interdisciplinary approach, 
using legal and political analysis, comparative historical analysis, political claims analysis, 
socio-economic and cultural analysis, longitudinal survey analysis, interview based analysis, 
and photo voice techniques (some of these methods are implemented later in the project). 
The research is innovatively designed as multi-level research on migration governance now 
operates beyond macro level actors, such as states or the EU. Migration management 
engages meso and micro level actors as well. Local governments, NGOs, associations and 
refugees are not merely the passive recipients of policies, but are shaping policies from the 
ground-up. 
The project also focuses on learning from refugees. RESPOND defines a new subject position 
for refugees, as people who have been forced to find creative solutions to life threatening 






This report is the part of the WP 2.3 work package of RESPOND, which explores border 
management and migration controls in the eleven countries selected for the RESPOND project 
(Austria, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iraq, Italy, Lebanon, Poland, Sweden, Turkey and the 
United Kingdom) between 2011 and 2017. The current report provides a comparative analysis 
of the legal frameworks and policy implementation in these eleven countries, drawing on the 
national reports submitted as the second deliverable of WP2. 
The key aims of the report are to explore patterns of convergence and divergence in relation 
to law, policy and policy implementation between these countries, map the key actors involved 
in border management and migration control in EU & non-EU countries, as well as to explore 
how the governance of border management and migration control has changed between 2011 
and 2017 in both EU and non-EU countries. Further, in order to contribute to the development 
of theoretical insights, we draw on key theoretical perspectives relating to border management 
and migration controls – such as literature on Europeanisation and the development of 
migration policy in the EU, and critical migration and border studies. 
Key findings include: 
• The border management and migration control legal regimes of the eight EU member 
states – with the exception of the UK – are largely harmonised at the level of formal 
transposition. However, there is still considerable divergence among the legal 
frameworks of the selected member states which can be partly attributed to the discretion 
allowed by EU legal frameworks in the process of transposition and competences 
reserved to member states, and partly due to national restrictive responses to the 2015 
migration movements in certain countries. 
• The domain of border management and migration controls is characterised by a high 
level of complexity in terms of actors. In most states of the Respond consortium, policies 
are implemented by civilian security bodies, while the role of military and para-military 
actors has risen in prominence. 
• Border management and migration control as a cross-sectional policy field does not only 
involve a multiplicity of actors, but central coordination is often lacking, while a slight trend 
to establish the later after 2015 can be observed in some countries. 
• Significant trends towards re-nationalisation are observed in the implementation of 
policies, exemplified by the prolonged introduction of temporary internal border controls 
by Austria, Germany and Sweden, and patterns of bilateral and multilateral cooperation 
among the security bodies of member states. 
• A trend towards securitisation of the policy field and the tightening of border controls can 
be observed in all countries both in terms of policy and narratives. During the 2011-2017 
period, and in particular since 2015, both EU and non-EU states tightened border 
controls, expanded internal control measures and the return regime, and created new 
border infrastructures ranging from walls and fences to detention centres that can be 
analysed as a ‘hardening of the border’. This trend also reflects developments at the EU 
level. 
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• The impact of EU legal and policy developments is particularly noticeable  in Turkey 
because of the accession and visa liberalisation processes, as well as the EU Turkey 
statement of March 2016. Similar trends can be observed in Lebanon and Iraq given 
cooperation agreements between the EU and these states. However, the expansion of 
border management regimes in these countries is more influenced by domestic security 
concerns, patterns of regional cooperation, mobility and conflict with neighbouring 
countries and the architecture of the border and migration controls as a global regime. 
• Human and fundamental rights considerations have been weakened since 2015. 
Pushbacks can be observed at many borders, while some countries have introduced 
measures that allow for an expansion of refusal of entry. Detention both during the asylum 





This report provides a comparative analysis of the legal frameworks and policy implementation 
relating to the domain of border management and migration control in the eleven countries 
selected for the RESPOND project: 
1. Austria (Josipovic and Reeger, 2019) 
2. Germany (Hänsel, Hess and Kasparek, 2019) 
3. Greece (Ilias et. al., 2019) 
4. Hungary (Gyollai and Korkut, 2019) 
5. Italy (Terlizzi, 2019) 
6. Iraq (Warda et. al., 2019) 
7. Lebanon (Jagarnathsingh, 2019) 
8. Poland (Szulecka, 2019) 
9. Sweden (Borevi and Shakra, 2019) 
10. Turkey (Gökalp Aras and Şahin Mencütek, 2019) 
11. UK (Karamanidou, 2019) 
We use the term border management to refer to the EU’s ensemble of legislation, policies, 
implementation practices, institutions, and actors that are concerned with defining, 
conceptualising, and policing of the external border of the member states of the EU. We use 
the term migration control to capture modes of control that might fall outside the scope of 
border management, especially as defined by the 2019 European Border and Coast Guard 
Directive (see Karamanidou and Kasparek, 2018). Drawing on the material provided in the 
country reports (deliverable 2.2), we focus on three key areas: 1) legal and policy frameworks, 
2) policy implementation, and 3) key narratives and themes, including an emphasis on the 
various actors involved on border management and migration control. 
The report has the following aims: 
• To explore patterns of convergence and divergence in relation to law, policy and policy 
implementation in the domain of border management and migration control among the 
selected EU and non-EU states 
• To map the key actors involved in border management and migration control in EU & 
non-EU countries, and re-conceptualise how they relate and interact with other actors, 
both within and beyond the EU 
• To critically examine the influence of EU border management & migration control on non-
EU countries 
• To explore how the governance of border management and migration control has 
changed between 2011 and 2017 in both EU and non-EU countries, and critically engage 
with perceptions of 2015 as a ‘watershed’ moment. 
• To consider the findings of the national country reports in light of existing theories and 
research insights relating to migration governance and the EU border regime. 
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The report starts with considering key theoretical perspectives relating to border management 
and migration controls. In particular, we focus on two dimensions: how migration governance 
is conceptualised through different theoretical approaches, and how these have explained 
shifts and transformation in the governance of borders and migration. Following this approach, 
we aim to elucidate, on the one hand, the complex interactions between legal instruments, 
implementation practices and actors, and on the other critically engage with the issue of 
change and transformation in governance especially in relation to the migration movements 
of 2015. 
The report draws primarily on the findings of the 11 national reports, while some additional 
desk research in order to supplement the provided information was needed. It focuses on the 
macro level of legal frameworks and policy, and the meso level of implementation, drawing on 
the empirical data generated by country teams through interviews with key stakeholders. By 
implementation, we refer mainly to practices, especially when diverging from law or policy, 
thus precluding transposition of EU legislation into national law which we consider under the 
analysis of national legal frameworks and policies. While several of the reports incorporate 
insights from the micro level – interviews from refugees and asylum seekers – we do not draw 
on these as they will be the subject of a separate deliverable1. A further limitation concerns 
our discussion of key narratives: as two of the three non-EU country reports did not contain 
this task, the relevant section in this report draws on the analyses of the selected EU member 
states only. 
The report is structured in the following manner. We first discuss theoretical insights on the 
conceptualisation of migration governance and policy change in the domain of border 
management and migration control. We draw on a range of theory and research on multi-level 
governance, Europeanisation, network and assemblage theories, and critical border and 
migration studies. The following section synthesises the findings of the 11 country reports on 
three areas: legal and policy frameworks, implementation and practices of border 
management and migration control, and key narratives. The section on legal frameworks and 
policy highlights key areas of divergence and convergence, while also taking into account 
changes in legal frameworks, especially in response to the 2015 migration movements. The 
section on trends and developments in implementation highlights dynamics which can be 
observed across the different countries studied for this report, both in terms of internal 
dynamics as well as with respect to arrangements in which the countries are actively involved. 
This is followed by an analysis of key narratives, which brings together the dominant discursive 
themes related to border management and migration controls in the eight EU member states. 
The last section discusses the findings in relation to the theoretical perspectives, and develops 
insights regarding the current state of the governance of border management and migration 
controls in the 11 selected countries, the configurations of key actors in the field, 
transformations of the EU border regime, and insight from comparing the EU and non-EU 
perspectives. 




2. Conceptualising Migration Governance and the 
Governance of Borders 
2.1 Multi-level governance and Europeanisation based 
approaches 
A starting point for conceptualising the governance of borders and migration controls is multi-
level governance (MLG). Apart from being a key theoretical concept for the RESPOND project, 
it is also a model of governance that explicitly or implicitly informs a considerable number of 
publications on EU policies on migration, including on border management and migration 
control (e.g. Ripoll Servent and Trauner, 2014; Hampshire, 2016; Trauner and Ripoll Servent, 
2016; Bonjour, Servent and Thielemann, 2018; Slominski and Trauner, 2018).  Further, the 
analysis of policy making and implementation in the asylum and migration domains within the 
EU, mainly in political science and political sociology, draws largely on theories of European 
integration – liberal intergovernmentalism (e.g. Moravcsik, 1993, 1998), neo-functionalism 
(Haas, 1958; Sandholtz and Stone Sweet, 1998), post-functionalism (Hooghe and Marks, 
2001, 2009; Börzel and Risse, 2018) and institutionalist approaches. The latter include formal 
institutionalism (e.g. Tsebelis and Garrett, 2001), rational choice institutionalism (e.g. 
Thomson et. al., 2006), constructivist institutionalism (e.g. Risse, 2004), and historical 
institutionalism (e.g. Steinmo, Thelen and Longstreth, 1992; Jenson and Mérand, 2010; Wolff, 
2012). 
In a multi-level polity such as the EU, policy making and policy implementation are dispersed 
among supranational, national and sub-national levels: EU institutions and agencies; national 
governments, ministries and national authorities; regions, and cities (Hooghe and Marks, 
2001; Scholten and Penninx, 2016). Multi-level governance approaches stress the analytical 
importance of focusing on relations between the different levels (Scholten and Penninx, 2016; 
Panizzon and van Riemsdijk, 2019). Thereby, the process of Europeanisation2 has 
engendered a relative loss of sovereignty and power for member states, and the gradual 
sharing of authority and competences among national, supranational and sub-national 
institutions (Bevir and Phillips, 2017; Hooghe and Marks, 2001, 2003; Scholten and Penninx, 
2016).  
The architecture of multi-level governance of asylum and migration policy is similarly linked to 
a process of Europeanisation within the framework of the EU. While migration and asylum 
governance was a strongly intergovernmental field, anchored in formal and informal 
cooperation between member states in the 1970s and 1980s, it has been gradually 
Europeanised through various policy developments: the creation of the Schengen Area, the 
supranationalisation of migration competencies from the Third Pillar to the First Pillar with the 
                                               2 When we use the term ‘Europeanisation’, we do not use it in the sense of e.g. Featherstone and 
Radaelli (2003). The emergence of their specific analytical angle marks an important milestone in 
research on Europe, i.e. research that is no longer concerned how ‘Europe’ is being constructed by its 
member states, but rather and inversely how European legislation affects national policies and local 
contexts. In the context of this report, we use a broader meaning of the term Europeanisation, i.e. the 
overall phenomena of European integration and its related policies and developments.	
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Treaty of Amsterdam (1997/99), the adoption of common legislative frameworks such as the 
CEAS, including the Dublin regulation and the Returns Directive, the establishment of 
European agencies such as Frontex and EASO and more recently the EBCGA, and the 
increased powers of the European Parliament under the co-decision arrangements introduced 
by the Lisbon Treaty (Baird, 2015; Hampshire, 2016; Trauner and Ripoll Servent, 2016).  
These developments have been theorised through the lens of theories of European 
integration. Explanations drawing on liberal intergovernmentalism have stressed the state’s 
drive to preserve sovereignty and avoid domestic conflict and constraints in policy making 
(Börzel and Risse, 2018; Guiraudon, 2000; Kaunert and Léonard 2012). The transfer of 
competencies to EU institutions is depicted as instrumental in achieving desired policy goals 
and outcomes (Bonjour, Servent and Thielemann, 2018; Hampshire, 2016). Neo-
functionalist approaches regard these developments as spill over effects from European 
integration itself creating functional interdependencies of policy sectors which require more 
integration, resulting in the transfer of powers to supranational institutions (Beck and Grande, 
2007; Baird, 2015; Niemann and Speyer, 2018). In this logic, for example, the need for free 
movement within Europe engendered a drive for supranationalising controls at the external 
borders which was accepted as a solution by domestic elites (Börzel and Risse, 2018; 
Niemann and Speyer, 2018). From the very beginning this was accompanied by a policy of 
externalization of European border and migration control policies and the inclusion of third 
countries into its rational (as an attempt to ‘venue shop outwards’, see Guiraudon and Lahav 
(2000)) thus transnationalising the multi-level governance architecture of the EU.	
What differs in these approaches is the relative degree of power and conceptual significance 
attributed to the supranational and national actors within the framework of multi-level 
governance. Liberal intergovernmental approaches regard member states as the most 
powerful actors in the context of multi-level governance, stress their impact on policy making 
within formal EU institutions such as the Council of Ministers, and conceive cooperation as 
driven by member states (Hampshire, 2016), often in informal fora in order to bypass EU laws 
and institutions (Cardwell, 2016; Hampshire, 2016; Trauner and Ripoll Servent, 2016), or 
domestic legal and judicial constraints – the ‘venue-shopping’ thesis (Guiraudon 2000). Neo-
functionalist and institutionalist approaches, on the other hand, emphasise the 
increasingly stronger role of European institutions in policy making, judicial oversight and 
implementation fields (Bonjour, Servent and Thielemann, 2018; Hampshire, 2016) and in the 
field of implementation, the increasing powers of agencies such as EASO and Frontex, but 
also the diffusion of implementing powers among the supranational, national and subnational 
levels (Baird, 2015). 
While the focus of such literature is often on the European Union, the concept of multi-level 
governance has been also employed to analyse the external dimension of EU migration policy 
(Panizzon and van Riemsdijk, 2019; Trauner and Wolff, 2014) – the linkage of migration and 
asylum policies to relations with other states and the ‘export’ of EU borders and border control 
policies to non-member states (Baird, 2015; Haddad, 2008; Paoletti, 2010).  Such 
arrangements can be located at the supranational level – for example, European Readmission 
Agreements are negotiated between the EU and third countries – but also the national level, 
in the case of bi- or multilateral agreements between member states and third countries 
(Panizzon and van Riemsdijk, 2019; Trauner and Wolff, 2014). However, the externalisation 
of migration and border policies often involves a multiplicity of non-EU actors - , such as 
intergovernmental organisations the UNHCR, the IOM and the ICMPD, national agencies like 
 13 
 
the GIZ in Germany, and NGOs - and is implemented via more informal ‘processes’, 
‘dialogues’ and regional consultations (Düvell, 2002; Hess, 2010; Georgi, 2007; Guiraudon 
and Lahav, 2000). 	
Regardless of the different theoretical explanations, the field of border management 
and migration control is thus conceptualised as combining both supranational – such as 
Schengen and the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (EBGCA) – and 
intergovernmental arrangements – such as the significant policy making and implementing 
competencies remaining with member states (Hampshire, 2016), whereas the institutional 
legacies of the intergovernmental era have privileged the influence of member states, despite 
the rise of competencies of EU institutions and agencies. This results in MLG arrangements 
characterised by the uneasy coexistence of liberal intergovernmental and supranational 
arrangements (Baird, 2015; Trauner and Ripoll Servent, 2016). Scholarship on the 
externalization of EU policies reflects a similar ‘intergovernmental’ emphasis whereby non-EU 
states are often conceptualized as being somewhat passive receptors of EU policy initiatives 
and actions (Trauner and Wolff, 2014; Wunderlich, 2012). Yet, the complexity of institutional 
arrangements, actors, and vertical and horizontal interactions among levels in the external 
dimension of EU border management and migration control has also been showcased 
(Collyer, 2016; Fakhoury, 2019; Panizzon and van Riemsdijk, 2019).  
Even if MLG approaches acknowledge the increasing influence of further 
intergovernmental agencies, such as the UNHCR, the IOM, or the ICMPD,  or private and non-
state actors such as  international, national and local NGOs, grassroots activist and solidarity 
groups, for-profit actors, militias, or migrants themselves – they continuously privilege formal, 
state-like actors in their conceptualisation of the architecture of the EU asylum and migration 
policy, whether supranational or national and stick to the different neatly, clear cut levels. 
Additionally, by mainly focusing on the legal and institutional dimensions and stressing 
rationality as main mover of policy making, most MLG approaches underplay the significance 
of discourses, practices and temporal and spatial dimensions that define how border 
management and migration control policies are being envisioned, designed, performed and 
put into practice. 
2.2 Assemblages, Networks, and European Border 
Regime 
The theories on European integration previously sketched out share one trait in that the 
different scales between the local and the supranational are taken as a fundamental (and clear 
definable) unit of analysis. This is of course most pronounced in the case of multi-level 
governance, which builds its entire analysis on the assumption of different scales that ideally 
can be separated. However, recent scholarship in MLG has also started to de-emphasise the 
concept of levels, focussing on networks or assemblages of actors from different levels 
(Panizzon and van Riemsdijk, 2019; Fine and Thiollet 2020, 11ff.). As we already indicated, 
the field of migration and border governance within the EU-framework, as well as in regard to 
its external dimension, is implemented by a multiplicity of actors, EU and national agencies, 
intergovernmental organizations and non-state and civil society actors of diverse degrees of 
institutionalisation, professionalization and internationalization. This multiplicity and 
diversification of actors is also acknowledged by the ‘migration management’ literature as well. 
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Migration management not only denotes a shift away from a zero migration policy to a 
conceptualization of the possibility to steer orderly migration processes but also suggests far 
reaching structural as well as practical transformations concerning the mode of governance 
and the type of actors involved (Gosh, 1997; Georgi, 2007; Cornelius et. al., 1996, Overbeck, 
2002). Thereby the literature emphasises ‘new actors of international politics’ like international 
organizations or even private actors like ‘think tanks’ (cf. Düvell, 2002; Georgi, 2007, 67f.; 
Guiraudon and Lahav, 2000, Geiger and Pécoud 2010). 
We find such conceptualisations not only in studies on migration and border governance in 
the context of the EU, but also in the study of other policy fields like climate policy and the 
emergence of global regimes. These two phenomena share that they are – at their core – 
concerned with the emergence of an order above the level of the nation state, but at the same 
time involving transformative effects that are felt below the level of the nation state. However, 
neither Europeanisation nor globalisation can be perceived or analysed as a form of 
federalism, i.e. the construction of a supranational state with existing nation state as its 
building blocks. Rather the process of Europeanisation within the EU framework itself creates 
new constellations of actors, new relations, power dynamics and new conflicts (Konfliktlinien) 
criss-crossing the different scales, so that the EU can be described as a new multi-layered 
network-like figuration (Konfliktraum) (Welz and Lottermann 2009). Ulrich Beck and Edgar 
Grande therefore describe the EU as an ‘transformation regime’, transforming the very mode 
of governance (2007).	
Precisely in order to capture the emergence of a new order on a global level, scholars of 
globalisation such as the sociologist Sassen and the cultural anthropologists Ong and Collier 
have applied the concept of assemblages to the study of globalisation (Sassen, 2008; Ong 
and Collier, 2005). Drawing on the Deleuzian notion of assemblages or agencements as 
instable, fluid and ever-emergent ensembles of disparate objects such as e.g. legal orders, 
policies, institutions, discourses, architectures and diverse materialities, their approach pays 
attention to similar fields as the study of European integration detailed above. However, the 
main difference is that this approach does not per se entail a hierarchical ordering, but that it 
arranges these objects in a networked manner. Such a conceptualisation has the added 
advantage of allowing for a study of their respective enactment in localisable settings. 
The inherent quality of emergence and instability captured in the notion of an assemblage may 
however not be that easily applied to Europeanisation. Indeed, globalisation has led to much 
more unstable forms of institutionalisation than what has been observed in European 
integration. Stable global institutions have thus far not emerged, unlike in the case of European 
integration, where the creation and solidification of actors such as the Commission, the 
Council and the Parliament – to name but the obvious – can be clearly identified. However, 
their relation to the member states and the role of the other actors, traditionally defined as 
non-state, is more complicated than a hierarchical ordering along scales or levels would 
suggest. For example, James Ferguson’s notion of transnational governmentality denotes a 
process in which local non-state actors like NGOs take on the role of state-like actors and with 
it are changing the scale from local to national or global. The sociologist Barry has showcased 
an analysis of European integration as the creation of technological zones erected by networks 
of expertise that cut across the existing scales (Barry, 2001, 2006).  
Additionally, Bigo shows in his analyses of the emergence of a ‘transversal field of in/security’ 
politics that it is ‘deployed at a level that is reducible neither to the national political field, nor 
 15 
 
to a level between two nations, or even to the European level’ (Bigo, 2008, 29). Walters and 
Haahr (2005) describe the emergence of ‘Schengenland’ as a transnational network. They 
argue that ‘the political space of Schengenland is not one where policing and security takes 
the form of a European superstate […] Instead it is a model of networks and of transnational 
liberal policing’ - transnational  as it connects experts and agencies across borders and ‘liberal’ 
as it is ‘networking existing agencies as a more economical and lighter form of governing than 
extensive new European bureaucracies’; new European agencies may be created ‘but they 
have to coordinate not replace national systems’. Schengenland does not repeat the process 
of state formation, rather it ‘invents other ways to distribute, network and circulate authority’, 
by the way of data-bases (such as SIS and Eurodac), the adoption of ‘common practices’ 
(such as visa), the ‘harmonization of standards such as external border management’ and by 
‘proxy-European authorities’ (particular states that take certain actions on behalf of the wider 
European community such as institutionalized by the Dublin convention) (Walters and Haahr 
2005, 205). Walters then applied this approach to many fields that are of interest to the 
RESPOND project, such as Schengen (Walters, 2002), European agencies (Barry and 
Walters, 2003), borders (Walters, 2004a; b; 2009) and deportation (Walters, 2019).	
Beyond this body of work, Foucauldian notions such as the ‘apparatus’ as a more stable or 
sedimented variant of the assemblage have been productively used in the anthropological 
study of specific European policy fields, localisable effects or concrete actors (Feldman, 2012). 
An alternative formulation would be the notion of a European border and migration regime 
(Sciortino, 2004; Tsianos, Hess and Karakayali, 2009; Hess, 2010). The notion of ‘border 
and/or migration regime’ draws both on the concept of international regimes (Krasner, 1983) 
and on insights of critical state theories and the anthropology of the state (Trouillot 2001), 
which conceptualise the state in a constructivist manner, as a set of forces and practices of 
becoming and acting like a ‘state’. Thus, it underscores how a multiplicity of actors without a 
formal hierarchy cooperate (or not) in order to establish a supranational order and a certain 
stability. Regime theory is therefore similarly interested in a heterogeneous ensemble of actors 
and actants, however pointing to the constant modes of contention, conflictual negotiations 
and situational alliances that can be observed within the regime.3  
The RESPOND methodology reflects the multilevel governance architecture of the field of 
migration and border policy within the EU-framework by shedding light on the Europeanisation 
and harmonisation of border management policies as well as by analysing the transposition 
of EU law into national legal frameworks and national developments in the 11 RESPOND 
countries. However, RESPOND additionally pays attention to the ‘meso level’ of political 
stakeholders as municipal administrations and non-state actors like NGOs as well as to the 
micro level of migrants themselves. These dimensions and actors complicate 
conceptualisations of multi-level governance that portray the different levels as clearly 
definable; rather all three levels together as well as a focus on actors, implementation and 
                                               3 Both the ‘ethnographic border regime analysis’ as well as the ‘non-local ethnography’ as proposed 
by Feldman (2012) conceptualise the field of study as networks, which allows for a detailed study of 
Europeanising dynamics by focusing on particular settings, such as in a detention centre at the border 
of Europe, a round-table discussion in Brussels, a virtual community of experts facilitated by 
information technology, etc.	
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practices as well as narratives indicates a complex regime approach that is challenged by the 
movements of (forced) migration. 
2.3 Explaining Changes in Policy 
One question that underpins the scope of WP2 concerns shifts and transformations in the 
governance of border management and migration control. Literature drawing on theories of 
European integration tends to focus on the role of member states or European institutions. For 
liberal-intergovernmental approaches, the drivers of policy change (or conversely stability) are 
member states, depending on their preferences and interests, which generally are considered 
to veer towards more restrictive policies – however defined (Bonjour, Servent and Thielemann, 
2018; Hampshire, 2016). Neo-functional approaches see policy change as rooted in self-
perpetuation dynamics for further integration, which provides the impetus for addressing 
existing functional mismatches arising from partially integrated policies (Niemann and Speyer, 
2018). Further, policy actors are socialised into cooperating within EU institutional 
arrangements (Niemann and Speyer, 2018). Beyond the commission’s role as an initiator of 
policy change (Niemann and Speyer, 2018), supranational institutions are assumed to have 
more ‘liberal’ policy preferences, curtail the restrictive tendencies of member states and steer 
policy changes towards more harmonisation – albeit often in the form of adopting minimum 
standards (Bonjour, Servent and Thielemann, 2018).  
Institutionalist approaches emphasise institutional change – for example in the form of the 
Amsterdam and Lisbon treaty reforms - as the driver for changes in policy (Trauner and Ripoll 
Servent, 2016). New decision-making procedures, for instance, favoured compromise and 
seeking consensus among EU institutions and member states (Trauner and Ripoll Servent, 
2016). Yet, for Bonjour et. al. (2018) the scope of policy changes is curtailed by the ‘growing 
weight of consensus and compromise in EU policy making’ (Bonjour, Servent and Thielemann, 
2018, p.416; Trauner and Ripoll Servent, 2016). Within an MLG framework, analyses adopting 
an institutionalist approach emphasise the complexity of relations among actors and the 
unpredictability of policy change processes and outcomes (Bonjour, Servent and 
Thielemann, 2018; Trauner and Ripoll Servent, 2016). Post-functional approaches, on the 
other hand, have drawn of the ‘politicisation of migration’ which regards domestic actors as 
sensitive to perceived hostile views to migration among publics and public reactions over the 
perceived loss of sovereignty, and therefore may resist to policy change towards greater 
supranationalisation (e.g. Börzel and Risse, 2018). The distribution of competencies among 
actors and levels, and disagreements over governance arrangements and the direction of 
policies have engendered significant policy tensions before 2015 (Hampshire, 2016). Yet 2015 
is increasingly regarded as a turning point in recent scholarship on the EU.  
Some recent studies on the events of 2015 and its repercussions define external events 
outside Europe as a main driver for policy changes (Hampshire, 2016). Events such as the 
Arab spring and the conflict in Syria, which engender movements towards Europe, are 
depicted as causing a ‘crisis’ for European migration policy (Hampshire, 2016). In contrast, 
Trauner and Ripoll Servent (2016), from an institutionalist perspective, argue that it is not the 
external events per se that drive change but they manner in which they are constructed and 
acted upon by EU institutions and member states. Discursively, this is illustrated by the 
manner in which the Arab spring movements, for example, were constructed as a ‘crisis of 
Schengen’, while the 2015 movements as a ‘migration crisis’ or ‘refugee crisis’. Some recent 
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literature in contrast interprets the ‘crisis’ (Niemann and Speyer, 2018, p.29) as a result of 
‘existing dysfunctionalities’ due to an incomplete integration and harmonisation in the domain 
of border and migration management, or as an outcome of ‘deeper gridlock’ resulting from 
‘structural deficiencies’ of the CEAS (Rizcallah, 2019, p.2) 
However, the diagnosis of policy responses varies widely among recent scholarship, 
oscillating between a re-nationalisation and strong intergovernmental tendencies on the one 
hand and the observation of strong supranationalizing efforts on the other. There is little 
disagreement that responses to the migratory movements of 2015 were indicative of strong(er) 
intergovernmental tendencies – the re-introduction of temporary border controls, more 
informalisation and resistance to supranational solutions such as relocation (Hampshire, 2016; 
Niemann and Zaun, 2018). Hampshire (2016) and Börzel and Risse (2018) both point to the 
right-populist politicisation of migration as an explanation for the responses of many member 
states to tighten the borders and restrict the access to the asylum and protection regime.  
Yet, Niemann and Speyer (2018) argued that the 2015 ‘crisis’ provided the impetus for 
greater supranationalisation, exemplified by the establishment of EBCGA and the increase 
of supranational competencies in the field of border controls. In this case, member states did 
not resist the Commission’s initiative, which they attribute to several reasons: the economic 
and political costs of obstacles to free movement within Schengen; functional legacies of 
cooperation within fora such as the Council of Ministers and Strategic Committee on 
Immigration, Frontiers and Asylum (SCIFA); the Commission’s rationale for the ‘necessity’ of 
strengthening external border controls (Niemann and Speyer, 2018). Further, one widely 
accepted policy development is the renewed focus on the externalization of migration 
governance, in particular through informal, intergovernmental arrangements like the EU-
Turkey deal (Cardwell, 2016; Niemann and Zaun, 2018; Panizzon and van Riemsdijk, 2019). 
Without rehashing the well-worn critiques of these models, suffice to say that the theoretical 
strands discussed so far tend to privilege institutional actors – whether member states or 
European institutions – afford a limited role to non-state actors and migration as such, 
overemphasise rationality and make often unsupported assumptions about the preferences of 
the key actors – for example for restrictive policies in the case of member states, and ‘liberal’ 
policies in the case of EU institutions and in particular the Commission (Bonjour, Servent and 
Thielemann, 2018; Hampshire, 2016; Jenson and Mérand, 2010; Trauner and Ripoll Servent, 
2016). Additionally, politicisation arguments tend to over-rely on the role of radical right parties 
as drivers of dominant attitudes among publics (Börzel and Risse, 2018; Hampshire, 2016). 
This underestimates not only the legacy and effects of securitising and illegalising policies and 
discourses both at the EU and national levels and among ‘mainstream’ political parties, as 
well as the impact of other social institutions – such as the media – in legitimating and 
reinforcing them. However, this lens also doesn’t take into account the continuing existence 
of human rights based and pro-migration orientated discourses and practices.  
In contrast, regime theory tends to include migratory movements much more strongly into 
considerations of policy change. Sciortino explains policy change as a recurrent effort to 
correct measures and to adjust to new migratory practices (2004, p.32f.) resulting in a 
structural crisis mode of migration governance in regimes. If regimes are constantly 
challenged by migration to adjust and to fix perceived deficiencies, these challenges translate, 
and are localisable, in ‘border struggles’ (Mezzadra and Neilson, 2013, p.264ff.). In these 
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struggles, which are not necessarily restricted to border sites, both modalities of control and 
subjectivities are negotiated, thus conceptualising migration as a co-constitutive force for 
border and migration regimes and at the same time highlighting the tension and frictions 
inherent in them.	
3. Comparative Findings from the National Reports 
The comparative report is based on eleven country reports that were prepared by the 
members of the RESPOND consortium. These countries can be clustered according to various 
categories. Eight countries are members states of the European Union (UK4, PL, SWE, GER, 
AUT, IT, HU, GR), seven are full members of the Schengen Area (PL, SWE, GER, AUT, IT, 
HU, GR), six share internal land borders with other Schengen members (PL, SWE, GER, AUT, 
IT, HU), and four maintain an extensive portion of the external Schengen border (PL, IT, HU, 
GR). Concerning the migrations across the so-called Balkan route of 2015, six countries need 
to be considered (SWE, GER, AUT, HU, GR, TUR), of which three can be included into a 
category of destination countries (SWE, GER, AUT). All the non-EU member states covered 
by the reports can also be considered destination countries (TUR, LEB, IRQ), while both 
Turkey and Lebanon need to be additionally considered as transit countries especially for 
forced migrations from the Syrian civil war. Only Turkey maintains a sizeable shared border 
with an EU member state (i.e. Greece and to a lesser extent Bulgaria). All three non-EU 
member states accommodate large refugee populations inter alia from the Syrian civil war, 
either in total numbers or per capita. 
This clustering already reveals that the country reports which form the base of this comparative 
report cover a wide and heterogeneous range. In this section of the report, we aim to identify 
and compare trends, dynamics and developments in the implementation of border 
management and migration control in the countries covered by the reports. To this end, this 
section excludes legislative developments as well as political (discursive) dynamics as these 
will be covered in different section of this report. Together, these three sections form the base 
for the analytical chapter. 
The UK, and to a lesser extent Poland, occupy a particular position with respect to the subject 
matter of this report. Historically, the UK’s border management and migration control system 
developed at a distance to the EU’s border and migration policies, as evidenced by the only 
partial participation of the UK in the Schengen system. Given the postcolonial condition which 
until today structures the patterns of migration to the UK and the UK’s insistence on 
maintaining a national border regime, the UK is not representative per se of larger European 
trends. However, as the country report on the UK notes, the UK does not necessarily oppose 
EU legislation, but rather prioritises its own national sovereignty over Europeanised concerns 
and rationalities (Karamanidou, 2019, p.9). 
The UK and Poland can be singled out amongst the countries this report covers since they 
have been neither a transit nor a destination country for the forced migrations of 2015. Indeed, 
only few refugees from Syrian have reached those two countries, and while the national 
                                               4 The UK exited the European Union on the 31st January 2020 but was a member state during the 
period considered in this report	
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political discourses certainly reacted to the unfolding dynamics, their respective politics of 
border management and migration control have been more concerned with (labour) migration 
from the East – Belarus and Ukraine – and at times with refugee migrations from Chechnya 
in the case of Poland, and both labour migration and asylum seeking in the case of the UK.  
As the analysis of trends and dynamics will show, Sweden, Germany and Austria can not 
only be clustered as destination countries for the forced migrations of 2015 but their political 
responses are also comparable. All three countries do not maintain extensive portions of the 
EU’s, and even Schengen external border, but are situated rather centrally within the 
Schengen area. Additionally, all three countries have long developed extensive asylum 
systems. To this end, the policy responses of these three countries are characterised by a 
selective introduction of national border controls, a focus on tightening internal controls, and 
an emphasis on strengthening return policy and practice as well as in the case of Germany a 
reinforced commitment to the external dimension referred to as an ‘externalization strategy’ 
(Vorverlagerungsstrategie) (2019: 25)  
Hungary stands in stark contrast to these three countries in various respects. It maintains not 
necessarily a large, but pivotal part of the EU’s external border with Serbia (as well as 
Ukraine), as well as Schengen borders with the EU member states of Rumania (with delayed 
full Schengen accession) and Croatia (full Schengen accession expected for 2020). While 
Hungary favours a policy of open borders on ethnic grounds, i.e. for Hungarian minorities in 
neighbouring countries, its government over the last year has been staunchly opposed to the 
access and settlement of refugees and has taken the lead in opposing such policies – such 
as the resettlement decisions of the Council in 2015 or the general introduction of a quota 
system – on the European level. To this end, Hungarian responses to the forced migrations of 
2015 which to a large extent transited through Hungary are constituted by the establishment 
of a materially hard border, an expansion of border control practices to its entire territory, and 
a severe restriction of asylum procedures and related practices. 
Such an almost total closure of borders towards forced migration and such a territorial 
homogenisation of border management and migration control practices cannot be observed 
in the other two EU member states with extensive portions of the Schengen border analysed 
in this report, i.e. Italy and Greece. For Italy, the respective country report observes 
ambivalent approaches. Concerning the Southern maritime external border, the report 
highlights a long-standing Italian policy of securitisation of the border, at times more strongly 
inflected with humanitarian notions as well as continuous efforts to externalise migration 
control across the Mediterranean into Northern Africa. The adoption of the hotspot approach 
for the South, i.e. the deployment of various EU agencies in reception centres at the border is 
a particularly vivid example. For the North, i.e. towards Slovenia, Austria, Switzerland and 
France, the report notes an intensification of control practices targeting inbound migratory 
movements, while the regulation of outbound migration remains at a low priority for the Italian 
government, and is rather imposed by the respective neighbouring countries. 
For Greece, the territorial division is even more striking, as three different regimes of border 
management and migration control can be observed. The hotspot approach has transformed 
the five islands of the East Aegean which were the main point of entry for the migrations of 
2015 into a zone of separate jurisdiction with the large-scale presence of European agencies, 
however building on previous Greek efforts at overhauling border management and migration 
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control policies and practices dating back to at least 2011. The Evros land border with Turkey 
in Greece’s North-East appears to remain in a mode of sovereign, national control with little – 
albeit noteworthy – European participation and scrutiny. Reports indicate that pushback 
practices towards Turkey have and still do constitute a key mode of border management and 
migration control. Greece’s mainland however has undergone large transformations through 
the gradual adoption of European instruments of asylum administration, turning Greece from 
a previous country of transit into a country of forced residence. 
Turkey then constitutes the most ambivalent case study, highlighting various oscillations 
between sovereign national interests and policy demands from the EUthrough the accession 
process on the one hand, and between humanitarian rationales and security interests on the 
other hand. Similar to the Italian case, Turkey’s border with Syria where a solid fortified wall 
was built and its Western maritime border with Greece (and thus the EU) that is still porous 
are distinct from each other. Between these borders we find efforts of the Turkish nation state 
to transform its institutions in charge of migration and border management into an ensemble 
more recognisable to European notions of migration management in line with the accession 
process while factoring in security implications raised by the ongoing civil war in Syria. Again 
similar to the Italian case, Turkey has often resorted to direct cross-border interventions.	
Lebanon, another country directly neighbouring Syria, and host to a large refugee population 
from the civil war, is an especially salient example for the heterogeneity which has already 
become apparent so far. While its Southern border with Israel is one of the rarer examples of 
a hermetically sealed border, the remaining border with Syria can be considered porous with 
a high occurrence of irregular migration but heavily militarised at the same time. However, 
control of the border is not as territorially bounded as one might expect from a superposition 
of Westphalian notions of borders to the Lebanese case. To this end, the report on Lebanon 
highlights that the emergence of Lebanon’s borders must be read against its specific colonial 
history and legacy, and that the notion of border in the Lebanese context should rather be 
understood in line with concepts such as frontiers, symbolic boundaries, fluid borderlands or 
‘dynamic spaces of historic interaction’ (Jagarnathsingh, 2019, p.9). Such a careful analysis 
is extended to the migration control to the interior of the country, where the report similarly 
points out that the institutions of the state and their control potential are results of ‘complex 
hybridisation[s] between state and non-state authoritative actors‘ (Jagarnathsingh, 2019, 
p.22), including external actors. 
Such an analysis certainly also applies to Iraq. As the country report points out, the emergence 
of state institutions tasked with border management and migration control has to be read 
against the nation building-efforts of the Coalition Provisional Authority during the occupation 
of Iraq. Similarly, provisions of autonomy and aspirations to independence in the Kurdish 
North, as well as the temporary, but complete loss of control over the Iraqi-Syrian border due 
to the expansion of territorial control by ISIS constitute pivotal events in the dynamic that 
shapes border and migration policies in Iraq. 
However, the salience and applicability of the analytical approach put forward in the report on 
Lebanon cannot be limited to states without EU membership. As the following discussion of 
trends and dynamics will underline, notions of border, border management, and their role in 
migration management are multivalent within the EU, too and need to be interrogated through 
genealogical as well as governmental perspectives, despite continued efforts within the EU of 
defining, introducing and implementing a notion of European integrated border management 
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(Karamanidou and Kasparek, 2018). The migrations of 2015 have foregrounded these 
different and differing historical legacies and have put them – at times – into sharp contrast. 
In a similar vein, the country reports all highlight that in any given country, the multiplicity of 
actors involved in border management and migration control needs to be noted, and thus form 
part of an analysis: complex hybridisation applies to the member states as well, especially in 
the emergent assemblages of sovereign, supranational and non-governmental actors created 
through the hotspot approach, as well as in new forms of bilateral and multilateral co-
operations. 
3.1 Legal and Policy Frameworks 
Our first dimension of analysis concerns legal and policy frameworks, and particularly the 
transposition of EU legislation into national legislation. We analyse the different sub-fields in 
four sections: pre-entry controls, at-the-border-controls, internal controls, as well as return and 
detention. 
3.1.1 Pre-entry controls 
3.1.1.1 Visas 
The EU legal framework on visas has been further harmonised with the recent introduction of 
Regulation (EU) 2018/1806 listing the third countries whose nationals must be in possession 
of visas when crossing the external borders and those whose nationals are exempt from that 
requirement, which replaced the previous Council Regulation (EC) No 539/2001. With the 
exception of the UK, all other selected member states follow the legislative framework on 
visas. Thus the issuance of short term visas is regulated by EU law, while member states 
retain competencies over the issuance of long-term visas, in addition to national visas issued 
under article 25 of the Visa Code. There is, therefore, some divergence at the level of national 
policy. Hungary, for example allows visa free travel for nationals of countries who have been 
on the ‘black list’ of Council Regulation 539/2001 and Regulation 2018/1806, such as 
Kyrgystan and Turkmenistan (Gyollai and Korkut, 2019). Both Poland and Hungary operated 
visa exemptions for Ukrainian citizens before Ukraine was added to the white list of countries 
whose nationals do not require visas (Gyollai and Korkut, 2019; Szulecka, 2019). 
Lebanon, Iraq and Turkey operate their own domestic legal systems. In Lebanon, the legal 
framework allows for visa-free travel for the citizens of seven Arab states5, a category of 79 
countries which can obtain cost-free visas for one month which can be extended to three 
months upon entry, and a black list of countries with higher requirements to obtain a visa 
(Jagarnathsingh, 2019). In Turkey, the visa regime is more aligned to the provisions of the 
EU visa code as a result of the country’s accession talks and the EU-Turkey readmission 
agreement, although it allows for visa exemptions for some countries in the EU black list 
(Gökalp Aras and Şahin Mencütek, 2019). Iraq similarly operates a system whereby some 
Arab, Middle Eastern and the ‘global north’ countries can obtain a visa on arrival, while citizens 
of the ‘global south’ countries require a visa before arrival. Similar to Turkey, the EU-
                                               5 Jordan, Bahrain, Kuweit, Oman, Qatar, UAE and Saudi Arabia	
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partnership and Cooperation Agreement refers to visas as an area to be aligned with the 
Schengen Acquis, and requirements for entry are similar to those of the Schengen framework. 
It is regulated in domestic law by the Foreigners’ Residency Law No 76 of 2017 and previously 
the Coalition Provisional authority orders (Warda et. al., 2019). Both Turkey and Lebanon 
tightened entry and visa requirements for Syrian nationals in response to movements from 
this country, replacing previous, more liberal arrangements that encouraged cross border 
mobility (Gökalp Aras and Şahin Mencütek, 2019; Jagarnathsingh, 2019). 
3.1.1.2 Carrier Sanctions, Advanced Passenger Information, Passenger Name 
Records 
All EU member states in the scope of this report have transposed Council Directive 
2001/51/EC. but differences can be observed in the transposed provisions of the directive. 
The level of fines imposed, for example, varies drastically among member states. The 
minimum level of fines, for example, is £2000 in the UK and €3.500 in Italy. Maximum fines 
range from £2000 in the UK to over the €500,000 allowed by the Directive in Poland, and 
€700,000 in Greece (when a person dies during transportation). In Greece, the legal 
framework imposes custodial sentences of more than 10 years to life imprisonment (Ilias et. 
al., 2019). In Hungary, the level of fines is determined by the national police (Gyollai and 
Korkut, 2019). In what concerns those seeking international protection Greek and Austrian law 
explicitly exclude rescue operations from the scope of penalties, while the UK does not. 
All EU member states in the scope of this report have transposed Council Directive 
2004/82/EC of 29 April 2004 on the obligation of carriers to communicate passenger data and 
Directive (EU) 2016/681 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on 
the use of passenger name record (PNR) data for the prevention, detection, investigation and 
prosecution of terrorist offences and serious crime. The UK extends the scope of directive 
2004/82/EC to rail and sea transport (Karamanidou, 2019), while in Sweden the scope is 
limited to air carriers only (Borevi and Shakra, 2019). In Greece and Italy, the PNR directive 
applies to intra-EU flights in addition to extra-EU flights designated in the directive. Fines for 
non-compliance range from a minimum of €3000 in Greece and Hungary to a maximum of 
€5,000 (Greece) to €50,000 (Italy). In some countries, Advanced Passenger Information (API) 
data are transmitted to several authorities, such as the Customs Agency and the Financial 
Guard in Italy, the Police and HMRC in the UK, while in Poland a wide range of named 
institutions have access to PNR data, including military bodies. UK law does not specify which 
‘competent authorities’ have access to PNR data. 
Both Turkey and Iraq have adopted carrier sanction legislation. In Iraq, they were introduced 
under the Coalition Provisional Authority in 2004, while in Turkey as part of the negotiations 
for the EU-Turkey Readmission agreement. Carriers in Turkey must also collect information 
on the internal travel of recipients of conditional refugee status and temporary protection status 
(Gökalp Aras and Şahin Mencütek, 2019). 
3.1.1.3 Immigration Liaison Officers (ILOs) 
All selected EU countries have transposed the ILO directive. In some cases (UK, Germany, 
Sweden, Austria, Sweden, Italy) legislation and practice predated the transposition of the 
Directive (ECORYS and International Centre for Migration Policy Development, 2018). In 
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others, like Hungary, legal frameworks and the development of ILO networks followed the 
introduction of the directive (Gyollai and Korkut, 2019). In addition to the ILO framework, some 
countries (Germany, Italy) are participating in the European Return Liaison Officers (ERLO) 
and European Migration Liaison Officers (EMLO) networks under Regulations 1168/2011 and 
1624/2016. 
Liaison officers from the selected countries are deployed in Turkey and Lebanon, which are 
also considered priority countries for the deployment of EMLOs. The first European Border 
and Coast Guard (EBCG) liaison officer was also deployed in Turkey (ECORYS and 
International Centre for Migration Policy Development, 2018) after 2016. 
3.1.2 At-the-border controls 
The ‘at-the-border’ domain of controls is largely harmonised in terms of European law, with 
the exception of the UK, which has opted out of the Schengen Acquis in this area apart from 
the facilitators package. While greater divergence is observed at the level of implementation, 
in some countries the EU legal framework – specifically the provisions of the Schengen 
Borders code – co-exists with domestic instruments – such as the 2003 law on Foreigners in 
Poland, Laws 3386/2005 and 4251/2014 in Greece, GrekoG (No 435/1996) in Austria and, 
inter alia the Criminal Code in Hungary – which elaborate on areas such as irregular entry. 
Some of these instruments are linked to the 2015 developments – for example in Hungary and 
Greece – in other cases they pre-existed. 
While those seeking international protection are generally excluded from the scope of 
provisions regarding refusal of entry, in practice national frameworks create legal spaces 
between unauthorised entry and seeking asylum, which may permit authorities to refuse entry 
or to detain at the border persons seeking international protection. In Greece, persons 
arrested for entering in an unauthorised manner can be detained for 48 hours until they declare 
their wish to request asylum and are directed to reception facilities for identification and 
screening (Ilias et. al., 2019). In Italy, migrants rescued or intercepted at sea are taken to 
hotspots and can be issued with refusal of entry orders if not intending to claim asylum 
(Terlizzi, 2019). In Hungary, the border area was extended from 8 km to inland in 2016, 
allowing the return of apprehended migrants to the transit zones and therefore precluding their 
entry into Hungarian territory (Gyollai and Korkut, 2019). The introduction of temporary internal 
border controls in Austria, Germany and Sweden under the Schengen Borders Code further 
facilitated the refusal of entry at the borders for persons seeking international protection 
(Hänsel, Hess and Kasparek, 2019; Josipovic and Reeger, 2019; Borevi and Shakra, 2019). 
German law allows for the refusal of entry at the border to asylum seekers who have entered 
from a safe third country or for whose application another member state is responsible under 
the Dublin regulation (Hänsel, Hess and Kasparek, 2019). In Austria, 12,301 people were 
denied entry in 2016 (Josipovic and Reeger, 2019). While the UK has not transposed the 
relevant EU legislation, it operates a regime whereby admission to the territory is temporary – 
exemplified by the statuses of ‘temporary leave’ and ‘immigration bail’ – and does not imply a 
right to remain. In Poland and Hungary, stricter measures were introduced in 2015. 
A further key area is the criminalisation of entry, since EU law, and in particular the facilitators 
package does not prohibit it. Entry is thus criminalised – designated as either an administrative 
or criminal offence – in all EU countries in this project. In Hungary, only entry through the 
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border closure – the fence constructed in 2015 – is a criminal offence. In terms of penalties, it 
carries only a fine in Austria and Italy, but in all other countries both a fine and/or a custodial 
sentence. 
Table 1: Penalties for irregular entry 
Country Fine Custodial sentence 
Austria €100 – €1,000 > 2 weeks 
Germany > €3000 > 3 years 
Greece €1500 minimum < 3 months 
Hungary HUF 5,000 - HUF 150,000 (until 2015) x 
Italy €5000 to €10000 x 
Poland Yes > 3 years6 
Sweden Yes > 1 year 
UK > £5000 > 2 years 
Iraq Yes*  > 3 years*  
Lebanon Yes*  x* 
Turkey Yes*  x* 
Source: Library of Congress (2019) Criminalization of Illegal Entry Around the World, 
https://www.loc.gov/law/help/illegal-entry/chart.php 
 
Table 2: Facilitation of irregular entry 
Country Fine Custodial sentence 
Austria yes 1-10 years 
Germany yes 5 years 
Greece < €20000 euro 
€50,000 if financial gain 
> 10 years 
< 10 min if financial gain 
Hungary 5,000 up to HUF 150,000 
(until 2015) 
1-5 years if there is financial gain 2-8 years 
commercial scale 
Italy > €15000 1-5 
Poland ? 6 months to 8 years 
Sweden ? 2 years 
UK > £5000 > 14 years 
Iraq n/a n/a 
Lebanon n/a n/a 
Turkey yes 3-8 years  
 
                                               6 If threat, violence or deception are used.	
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The facilitation of unauthorised entry is criminalised in all selected member states but domestic 
laws differ in what concerns the ‘appropriate sanctions’ stipulated by Council Directive 
2002/90/EC. Only Germany requires the presence of a material or financial benefit for 
facilitation to be a punishable offence (Vosyliūtė and Conte, 2018; Carrera et. al., 2016, 2018). 
In the UK, the law designates seeking protection as a defence in the case of prosecution. 
Italy and Greece have legal provisions exempting humanitarian actors from the scope of the 
Facilitators directive, while in Poland authorities may refrain from punishment in exceptional 
circumstances (European Migration Network, 2017). Although the extension of provisions on 
facilitation to civil actors is mostly a matter of implementation rather than law, Hungary 
explicitly criminalises civil sector organisations providing support with accessing the asylum 
procedure and humanitarian assistance (Gyollai and Korkut, 2019). In a related measure, in 
2016 Greece introduced a legal requirement for the registration of NGOs (Carrera et. al., 
2018).  
All non-EU countries have frameworks regulating border management reflecting a similar 
architecture of entry conditions and border checks, such as determining conditions of entry 
and exit, the required ID documents, fixed border crossing points and the use of databases 
(Gökalp Aras and Şahin Mencütek, 2019; Jagarnathsingh, 2019; Warda et. al., 2019). 
Unauthorised entry is a criminal offence in Lebanon, carrying both administrative and criminal 
penalties (Jagarnathsingh, 2019). However, the main legal framework, the Law Regulating 
Entry, Stay and Exit of Foreigners dates back to 1962 and is lacking detailed provisions (ibid.). 
In Iraq, the Foreigners’ Residency Law No. 76 of 2017 and the Coalition Provisional Authority 
Order no 16 regulate conditions of entry and border checks. The Asayish – the authority of the 
Kurdistan region – has responsibility over border control in the Kurdish territory. Further, the 
EU-partnership and Cooperation Agreement refers to border management and control, as well 
as admission rules, as key areas of cooperation (Warda et. al., 2019). Persons seeking 
international protection need to apply before entry, to Iraqi diplomatic missions, or at the 
border. Their application must be examined and approved by the Ministry of the Interior, at the 
recommendation of the Permanent Committee for Refugee Affairs, before entry is granted. 
Until then, the applicant can be detained in police stations at the border for two months (Warda 
et. al., 2019). 
Legal arrangements in Turkey are aligned to a large extent with the EU framework because 
of the accession and visa liberalisation processes, and include provisions for entry and exit, 
fingerprinting of asylum seekers at the border, the conduct of border checks. They also contain 
legislation on smuggling which is aligned with the provisions of the facilitators package, and 
in addition exempt humanitarian motivations from the provisions on smuggling (Gokalp Aras 
and Şahin Mencütek, 2019). Lebanon and Turkey have also ratified the UN Protocol against 
the Smuggling of Migrants by Land Sea and Air (Gökalp Aras and Şahin Mencütek, 2019; 
Jagarnathsingh, 2019). In what concerns the borders with Syria, both Lebanon and Turkey 
after years of a more or less ‘open door’-policy towards Syrian people fleeing the civil war, 
introduced reinforced border controls since 2015 (Gökalp Aras and Şahin Mencütek, 2019; 
Jagarnathsingh, 2019). In contrast, the Iraqi authorities, and in particular the Kurdish Regional 
Government (KRG) adopted a more laissez faire approach in allowing entry of Syrian refugees 
but mainly of Kurdish and Assyrian rather than Arab origin (Warda et. al., 2019). 
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Yet, arrangements at the Lebanese-Syrian border regarding at-the border checks were 
informed by the porosity of the borders in the area and cross border mobility patterns, mainly 
for labour. Mobility across the Lebanon-Syria border was regulated through bilateral treaties 
which allowed for an ‘open door’ policy for Syrians and Lebanese and facilitated the ‘flow of 
cheap, ‘cash in hand’ labour from Syria into Lebanon’ (Jagarnathsingh, 2019). The porosity of 
the Lebanese-Syrian border was also exemplified by the cross-border movement of armed 
groups (ibid.). In a similar manner, the southern Turkish border with Syria has been 
characterised by patterns of cross border movements and close ties between communities on 
either side of the border (Gökalp Aras and Şahin Mencütek, 2019). Similarly, long-term 
transborder ties and activities across the Iraqi border, in particular among Kurdish populations 
in the region, facilitated the crossing into Iraq during the mass displacements of 2013/2014 
(Warda et. al., 2019; see also Dionigi, 2019). This mobility regime came to an end with the 
introduction of border controls by Turkey and Lebanon in 2015, and the construction of a 
border wall by the former country. 
3.1.2.1 Border surveillance 
Border surveillance is of varying significance depending on the geographical position of the 
country. Countries with external borders such as Italy, Greece, Hungary and Poland have 
extensive practices of patrolling their sea and land borders using both conventional 
(e.g. police, army or border guard patrols) and technological means (e.g. thermal cameras). 
Frontex, the European Border and Coast Guard Agency, is involved in border surveillance 
operations in Greece, Italy and Hungary (Ilias et. al., 2019; Terlizzi, 2019; Gyollai and Korkut, 
2019).  
Sea border surveillance both in Italy and Greece, is intertwined with Sea Rescue Operations. 
Both countries have ratified international legal instruments such as the International 
convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, the International Convention on Maritime Search and 
Rescue and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, although in Greece there 
is a stronger division between border surveillance and search and rescue (SAR) operations in 
law. In both countries, national authorities border management and sea rescue operations are 
supported by Frontex. 
Countries that were on the routes of the 2015 movements intensified border surveillance 
measures. While Greece constructed a fence in a section of the Greek-Turkish land border in 
Greece in 2012,7 before the 2015 developments, Hungary constructed a fence in the Serbian 
border in 2015 and Austria in the border with Slovenia in 2016. In Hungary, the ‘border-
hunter’ unit, a paramilitary group, was established in 2015 with specific responsibilities for 
border surveillance and enforcing laws on unauthorised entry (Gyollai and Korkut, 2019). 
Similarly, a unit called PUMA was established in 2018 in Austria (Josipovic and Reeger, 
2019). 
Beyond the eight EU member states, Turkey has an extensive framework regulating border 
surveillance (Gökalp Aras and Şahin Mencütek, 2019). It also constructed a high-security wall 
at the Syrian border as part of an ‘Integrated Border Security System’ incorporating 
technological means of control such as fibre optic sensors and observation balloons. The 
Turkish coast guard is also assisted by Frontex as well as NATO forces. Operations, however, 
take place against a continuing dispute with Greece concerning the maritime border between 
the two countries. In Iraq, border surveillance operations – including fixed infrastructure and 
                                               7 Bulgaria a fence in a section of its land border with Turkey in 2014	
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patrolling of the border – are under the Ministry of the Interior insofar the land border is 
concerned, while the Asayish has responsibility over surveillance of the Kurdistan region. 
Border surveillance at sea is the responsibility of the Iraq Navy. Similarly the Lebanese Navy, 
assisted by the UNIFIL mission is responsible for border surveillance in Lebanon. Surveillance 
of the land border with Syrian is conducted by the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF), while the 
Southern border with Israel is surveilled by both LAF and Hezbollah. 
Treaties and agreements among neighbouring EU member states also have an impact on 
land border management practices. Austria signed treaties with Italy and Hungary allowing 
for police cooperation on border surveillance and policing (Josipovic and Reeger, 2019). It 
also has bilateral action plans related to migration control with 6 countries: Albania, Serbia, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Macedonia and Montenegro. Police treaties in Germany 
provide the basis for cooperation on border controls with Austria and Italy – e.g. a trilateral 
border guard unit controlling the ‘Brenner-route’ from Italy, via Austria towards Germany. 
Similarly, Hungary has a bilateral treaty with Slovakia which allows for joined patrols and ID 
checks, while within Visegrad group activities, Polish, Czech and Slovakian border guards 
have been deployed at the Hungarian-Serbian border in 2015 (Gyollai and Korkut, 2019). 
3.1.3 Internal controls 
3.1.3.1 Conditions of Stay 
In all EU member states in the scope of this report, the provisions of stay for refugees are in 
line with EU law – for example refugees generally have the right to obtain travel documents, 
status is not permanent and revocation of status generally reflects the provisions of the 
directive. Differences are observed in terms of the length of refugee status and subsidiary 
protection. Table 3 summarises the differences in the 8 EU member states represented in this 
report. 
With the exception of the UK, which has not transposed Directive 2011/95/EU, most of the 
other countries tend to keep the minimum standards set by the Directive insofar the duration 
of the refugee status is concerned. In Sweden, a temporary change from permanent residence 
issued with protection status to a time-limited one of three years was introduced in response 
to the 2015 movements in 2017 but it has been extended to 2021 (Borevi and Shakra, 2019). 
Table 3: Duration of protection status 
Country Refugee status Subsidiary protection 
Austria 3 1 
Germany 3 1 
Greece 3 3 
Hungary 10 3 
Italy 5 5 
Poland 3 2 
Sweden 3 1 
UK 5 5 
Iraq n/a n/a 
Lebanon n/a n/a 
Turkey n/a n/a 
Source: ECRE (2016) 
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3.1.4 Detention and restrictions on freedom of movement 
Asylum seekers are generally subject to a wide range of internal controls. All countries allow 
for the detention in accordance with the provisions of Directive 2013/32/EU. Time limits vary. 
In Greece, the law stipulates time limits of 45 days for reasons related to the examination of 
asylum applications, and three months if there are considerations related to public order or 
absconding. However, the law also allows for the extension of detention to 18 months. The 
detention of asylum seekers in the UK is allowed on grounds provided in national law which 
does not refer specifically to asylum seekers. In essence, detention is decided on a case by 
case basis on grounds stipulated in policy rather than law. There is no time limit for the 
detention of asylum seekers in the UK. In Hungary, following the establishment of the transit 
zone, asylum seekers can be detained indefinitely (Hungarian Helsinki Committee, 2018). 
Similarly, all selected EU member states impose residence limitations and reporting 
obligations on asylum seekers. All selected EU member states allow for the authorities to 
designate the place of accommodation of asylum seekers. In the UK, under the dispersal 
system, asylum seekers must reside in cities and accommodation specified by the Home 
Office. The introduction of the 8km-rule in Hungary in 2016 and its extension to the whole 
country in 2017 provided for the ‘escort of migrants’ without status as well as asylum seekers 
back to the transit zone at the border (Gyollai and Korkut, 2019). In Austria and Germany 
residence and reporting obligations were tightened after 2015. In Austria, after a new law was 
introduced in 2017, asylum seekers who have committed criminal offences, are under criminal 
suspicion, or for reasons of ‘public interest, public order or a fast processing of an application’ 
can be ordered to stay in designated accommodation centres. Non-compliance carries fines 
of EUR 5,000 to EUR 15,000. Germany, one of the key destinations of the 2015 movements, 
similarly introduced legal amendments that considerably tightened accommodation and 
residency obligations and made violations of the residence obligation a reason for ceasing 
asylum procedures (Hänsel, Hess and Kasparek, 2019). 
In Greece, the hotspot regime influences practices of detention and limitation of residence 
stay requirements are also shaped by the hotspot regime. In Greece, the law allows for a 3-
day restriction of liberty within hotspots in order to complete registration and screening 
procedures. This can be extended by the manager of the hotspot to 25 days if the procedures 
are not completed. Furthermore, a geographical prohibition applies to the hotspots, meaning 
that applicants for international protection are obliged to stay in the island where the hotspot 
is located. Authorities can also place restrictions regarding the place of residence of asylum 
seekers outside the hotspot system in order to examine their asylum application or because 
of public order considerations. In contrast, migrants seeking international protections can be 
detained in hotspots in Italy, but there is no clear legal framework (Terlizzi, 2019). 
Neither Lebanon or Iraq have ratified the United Nations Convention relating to the Status of 
Refugees, while Turkey has adopted it with a geographical limitation which dictates that only 
European asylum seekers are entitled to international protection in the sense of the Geneva 
convention (Gökalp Aras and Şahin Mencütek, 2019; Jagarnathsingh, 2019; Warda et. al., 
2019). Non-European asylum seekers may receive a ‘conditional refugee status’, 
administered by the UNHCR, while Syrian refugees receive the status of ‘temporary protection’ 
(Gökalp Aras and Şahin Mencütek, 2019). 
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In Iraq, refugee status can be revoked by an order from the Ministry of the Interior on the 
grounds of security or the political interests of the state. In the absence of specific legal 
provisions in Iraqi law, the stay of applicants for international protection and refugees is 
regulated by the Foreigners’ Residency Law No 76 of 2017. Refugees can be detained and 
deported for security reasons or breaching deportation orders for up to two months (Warda et. 
al., 2019). Staying in Iraq with an expired visa carries financial penalties (Warda et. al., 2019). 
Restrictions to the place of residence of non-nationals also apply. Further, public services are 
not provided to people with no valid identity documents (ibid.). 
In Lebanon, a Memorandum of Understanding between the country’s authorities and the 
UNHCR provides the legal basis for asylum seekers and refugees to stay in the country 
temporarily, although in reality, it is only applied to non-Palestinian and non-Syrian refugees 
(Jagarnathsingh, 2018, p.24). As domestic law only recognises persecution for political 
reasons, displaced populations in Lebanon – such as Syrians since 2011 – are not recognised 
as refugees by the Lebanese state but are registered with the UNHCR. Thus, protections 
against expulsion and detention arise from international human rights instruments which 
Lebanon has ratified, rather than from domestic law. At the same time, unauthorised stay and 
the use of forged documents, and staying in the country after a deportation order was issued 
are criminal offences (Jagarnathsingh, 2019). They carry both administrative and criminal 
sanctions, including a fine and up to three years’ imprisonment, as well as deportation. Those 
who receive criminal sanctions can be detained after the criminal sentence is completed (ibid.). 
Lebanon is still following a ‘no camp-policy’, meaning that there are no obligations or 
restrictions where to live and stay but there is also no state administered humanitarian 
infrastructure. 
Turkey has a more complex regime whereby conditions of stay depend on the specific 
protection status. Those with conditional refugee status have to reside in accommodation 
centres in 51 so called satellite cities until their applications for protection are finalised (Gökalp 
Aras and Şahin Mencütek, 2019). Once they are allocated to a city, they must transfer there 
within 15 days; if not, their application may be deemed withdrawn, which can result in 
deportation (Çetin et. al., 2018; Gökalp Aras and Şahin Mencütek, 2019). This status is not 
permanent but allows recipients to stay in Turkey until resettled by the UNHCR (Çetin et. al., 
2018). Those with temporary status – Syrian refugees – have to reside in designated provinces 
rather than cities. For Syrian refugees the Turkish state as well as several humanitarian actors 
have established several camps, especially along the Syrian border.  
3.1.4.1 Criminalization of unauthorized stay  
All selected EU member states as well as Turkey criminalise unauthorised stay by a fine, while 
in UK, Germany, Sweden and Austria the law also allows for custodial sentences. Austria 
introduced penalties from €5,000 to €15,000 or imprisonment of up to six weeks for staying in 
the country in violation entry ban or exclusion order (Heilemann, 2019). In all selected 
countries, those staying without legal status are subject to return procedures. However, in 
some countries the law allows for stay on humanitarian reasons (Poland, Greece) or in 
‘tolerated stay’ status if deportation is not possible (Poland, Austria, Germany). There are 
different rights attached to these statuses. For example, those with a humanitarian permit in 
Poland can work and travel to other EU member states, while those on tolerated stay can work 
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but not travel (Szulecka, 2019). In contrast, the UK, under hostile environment policies, has 
developed a host of restrictive measures such as prohibitions to rent accommodation, have a 
driving license or open a bank account without legal status (Karamanidou, 2019). In some 
countries, changes to the legislation were introduced in response to the 2015 movements. 
Greece, for example, allowed for the employment of third country nationals without status. 
Sweden, in contrast, removed financial support and accommodation for those under return 
procedures (European Migration Network, 2017). 
Table 4: Criminalisation of Stay 
Country Fine Custodial sentence 
Austria 500 - 15,000 > 6 weeks 
Germany yes 1 year 
Greece yes no 
Hungary yes N/A 
Italy yes no 
Poland yes N/A 
Sweden yes > 1 year 
UK > £5000 > 6 months 
Iraq 100,000 Iraqi Dinars for expired; and 10,000 per day  
after expiration of visa up to 5,000,000 Iraqi Dinars 
n/a 
Lebanon Yes Yes 
Turkey n/a n/a 
 
 
Table 5: Facilitation of irregular stay 
Country Fine Custodial sentence 
Austria > 5000 > 1 
Germany yes > 5 years 
Greece > 5000 
< 10000 if financial motivation 
> 1 year 
Hungary no > 2 years 
Italy €15,500 > 4 years 
Poland ? 3 months to 5 years 
Sweden yes 2-6 years 
UK Yes > 14 years 
Iraq n/a n/a 
Lebanon n/a n/a 
Turkey n/a n/a 
Facilitation of stay, similarly to the facilitation of irregular entry is criminalised in all countries, and 
generally carries custodial sentences and/or fines. A financial or personal benefit motivation must 





3.1.4.2 Internal controls and apprehensions 
Measures concerning the control of migrant populations within the territory of the state – with 
the exception of police checks as stipulated by the SBC- are the prerogative of member states. 
They encompass a range of measures such as requirements to report to the police or other 
authorities, ID checks, and checks in workplaces. 
In Sweden, the Police and the Migration Agency can ask third country nationals to provide 
information about their stay, which is enforceable by police action if the request is refused 
(Borevi and Shakra, 2019). While there is no obligation for third country nationals to carry 
passports or other ID documents with them, they must present them to the police if the latter 
conduct checks on their right to remain in the country (ibid.). In Poland, non-nationals are 
legally required to present documents allowing their stay in Poland and can be fined if they do 
not do so at the request of authorities (Szulecka, 2019). In Italy, by contrast, a person can 
refuse to show an ID card, although it is a criminal offence not to provide information on their 
identity (Terlizzi, 2019). Measures such as ID checks in public places or transport routes are 
applied in all selected countries. Under ‘hostile environment’ policies, the UK law also obliges 
public services – such as the NHS, local authorities and schools - to inform immigration 
enforcement agencies on the status of persons, including children (Karamanidou, 2019). 
Similarly, in Austria irregular migrants have no option but to register with local authorities as 
landlords and schools often request proof of residence (Josipovic and Reeger, 2019). 
Employment checks are regulated by the Employers Sanction Directive which has been 
adopted by all EU member states except the UK. All EU countries in the scope of this report, 
including the UK, have legal regimes in place that target the employment sector as a means 
to control unauthorised migration. In most countries, measures related to employment involve 
workplace checks and raids and target mainly employers (Karamanidou, 2019; Szulecka, 
2019; Borevi and Shakra, 2019). While these measures target migration, they are often the 
responsibility of ministries overseeing employment, for example in Italy, Poland and Greece 
(Terlizzi, 2019; Szulecka, 2019; Ilias et. al., 2019). Another set of measures concerns the use 
of databases for monitoring the presence of third country nationals and enforcing internal 
apprehension measures. With the exception of the UK, which only has access to the SIS II 
(but only in relation to criminal offenses) and Eurodac databases, all other EU countries have 
access to all databases. However, in addition to these, domestic police databases, such as 
the Central Register of Foreign Nationals in Germany, the Central Register of Residents in 
Austria or Police Online in Greece do also exist. 
There are equally expansive regimes for internal control measures in the three non-member 
state countries. In Iraq, the architecture of internal controls is largely informed by legacies of 
conflict and the security situation, and includes reporting obligations to the Ministry of the 
Interior for visa holders, checkpoints and identity checks at the entrance and exit points of 
major cities, and informing the authorities of changes of address (Warda et. al., 2019). 
Similarly, following the assassination of Prime minister Hariri in 2005, security arrangements 
in Lebanon involve an array of measures of surveillance, constraints (such as roadblocks and 
profiling of pedestrians and vehicles), and checkpoints, including at the Palestinian refugee 
camps outside Beirut. While these measures are aimed at the wider population, they mainly 
affect migrants with no legal status and refugees (Jagarnathsingh, 2019). In Turkey, recipients 
of conditional refugee status and temporary protection must report to the authorities at regular 
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intervals, inform them of changes of address, and in the case of the latter group changes of 
employment and in personal circumstances (e.g. marriage). Non-compliance with reporting 
obligations can lead to withdrawal of protection statuses. Both groups have to obtain travel 
permits in order to leave their city or province of residence (Gökalp Aras and Şahin Mencütek, 
2019). 
3.1.5 Return and Detention 
All EU countries except for the UK have transposed the Returns directive and all are bound 
by the Dublin regulation. The legal framework of the selected member states is thus largely 
europeanised although several member states, for example, use the derogation powers 
stipulated in Article 2 (2) of the Return directive. Greece and Hungary exclude third country 
nationals apprehended and refused entry under article 13 of the SBC at external border areas 
from the remit of the Returns Directive, applying instead domestic legal provisions on 
deportation. The same exception applies in Germany and Austria, although the two countries 
do not have external borders apart from international airports. Sweden, Germany and Austria 
exclude from the provisions of the directive those subject to a refusal of entry; Austria and 
Sweden those subject to return as part of criminal law sanctions, and Sweden and Germany 
those subject to extradition procedures. Return decisions can be issued even if the authorities 
do not know the whereabouts of the person subject to return (Austria, Germany, Sweden, 
UK) or if the person subject to return procedures does not have the necessary documents 
(Austria, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Sweden, UK). Other provisions, in relation to the issuing of 
return orders, appeal mechanisms, detention entry bans and voluntary return have been 
transposed in a manner reflecting the provisions of the directive. All countries have voluntary 
returns schemes. 
Nevertheless, there is considerable divergence in other areas. All selected countries allow for 
detention not only on the grounds prescribed by the Return directive – the risk of absconding 
and in order to prepare the removal, especially when a person does not cooperate – but also 
for a wide range of other reasons. For example, Greece, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Poland 
and Sweden all allow for pre-return detention on the grounds of national security and/or 
criminal offences; Austria, Poland and Greece for non-compliance with voluntary departure; 
Hungary for violations of the code of conduct in detention centres and for procedural delays 
in enforcing the return decision. In the 2018 reform of the Return Directive, several of these 
grounds, which reflect the European Commission’s 2017 Action Plan and Recommendations 
on returns were included in the proposed text. In terms of the length of detention, four selected 
countries (Austria, Germany, Greece, Poland) allow for the maximum time limit for detention 
of 18 months, two countries (Hungary and Sweden) for 12 months. In Italy the maximum time 
limit for detention was 3 months until 2018, then increased to 6 months, as suggested in the 
Commission’s 2017 recommendations. The UK, in contrast, has no time limit for detention. 
The length of entry bans also varies among countries, and exceeds the 5 years suggested in 
the Directive, especially in cases of serious criminal offences. 
Return is an area where legislative change – as well as developments in implementation – 
can be observed especially since 2015. Germany since 2015 reduced the time limit for 
suspension of deportation, prohibited the notification of deportation, tightened provisions for 
expulsion of migrants with a criminal record, limited the grounds for suspending a removal due 
to health concerns, and expanded provisions for pre-removal detention both in custody 
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facilities and accommodation centres (Hänsel, Hess and Kasparek, 2019). In 2017, yet 
another law introduced an array of measures aimed at facilitating deportation such as 
expanding the grounds for detention for the purpose of return, enhancing reporting measures 
and allowing for the confiscation of documents. Sweden amended its law on return in 2017, 
which expanded police powers on deciding the detention and return of minors (Borevi and 
Shakra, 2019). Austria extended the time limit of detention to 18 months in 2017, while Italy 
from three to six months in 2018. In Hungary, following changes in the criminal law in 2015, 
migrants can be deported if they enter through the border closure or damage the border fence 
(Gyollai and Korkut, 2019) (European Commission 2017). In what concerns returns under the 
Dublin Regulation, we should note the emergence of bilateral agreements outside the scope 
of the regulation itself. 
 
Table 6: maximum length of re-entry bans in years 












The legal frameworks governing return and detention for return in the three non-member 
states present both similarities and differences. In Lebanon, those imprisoned for offenses 
related to forged documents and authorisation are liable to deportation after the completion of 
their sentences. However, they may be detained again in practice, and the legal grounds for 
detention on the basis of deportation in Lebanon are ‘unclear and inadequate’ (Global 
Detention Project cited in Jagarnathsingh, 2019) in particular in what concerns the distinction 
between criminal and administrative detention. There is no time limit for detention. Further, 
the authorities can deport third country nationals who are deemed a threat to public security. 
As mentioned before, recognised refugees can be deported from Iraq after their status is 
revoked. The law provides for the expulsion of persons with no legal status, for the imposition 
of restrictions in the place of residence with a view to deportation, and the deportation of family 
members. However, unlike in most EU member states bound by the return directive, there are 
no rights of appeal against deportation. Deported persons are prohibited from re-entering Iraq 
without authorisation from the ministry of the Interior (Warda et. al., 2019). 
In Turkey, persons subject to return include those entering without authorisation and who did 
not apply for protection, persons with no legal status, attempting to leave Turkey in an 
unauthorised manner and those convicted for terrorist or criminal offences. The legal 
framework for return is largely aligned with that of the EU. It stipulates, for example, the 
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issuance of return decisions, allows for a period of voluntary departure, safeguards against 
refoulement and rights to appeal against return decisions (except for those with criminal or 
terrorism convictions). Detention of up to 12 months is allowed on grounds as those in the 
Returns directive as well as for public order, public security or public health reasons, and can 
also be appealed. Provision is also made for the detention of families and unaccompanied 
minors in separate areas (Gökalp Aras and Şahin Mencütek, 2019). 
3.1.6 Readmission agreements 
In addition to the countries with which EU has readmission agreements, several of the selected 
countries have entered bilateral agreements which are significant in the context of the 
migratory movements that RESPOND focuses on. Greece signed a bilateral agreement with 
Turkey in 2002, which provided the basis for returns under the EU-Turkey Statement but was 
suspended by the Turkish government in 2018 (Gökalp Aras and Şahin Mencütek, 2019; Ilias 
et. al., 2019). Sweden entered a bilateral memorandum with Afghanistan. The UK has entered 
Memoranda of Understanding with six countries outside the EU list: Erupt, Libya, Jordan, 
Lebanon, Ethiopia, Morocco and Afghanistan (Karamanidou, 2019). In 2017, Italy introduced 
a law allowing for readmission agreements with third countries for the purpose of return 
(European Migration Network, 2017). 
All three non-member states have agreements with the EU concerning the readmission of their 
own nationals. The EU-Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with Iraq contains clauses 
on the readmission of Iraqi nationals ‘without further formalities’ while it also contains a clause 
on a potential agreement for the readmission of third country nationals (Warda et. al., 2019). 
A similar provision in included in the EU-Lebanon association agreement. Lebanon further 
has readmission agreements with Romania, Bulgaria, Cyprus and Switzerland. The EU-
Turkey readmission agreement signed in 2013 and entered into force in 2016 provided for the 
return of Turkish citizens as well as third country nationals, although the latter provision was 
not implemented. The 2016 EU-Turkey statement, although not a legal instrument allowed for 
returns from Greece to Turkey. However, its legal basis was the 2002 Readmission agreement 
between Greece and Turkey, which as mentioned above has been suspended since 2018. 
3.2 Implementation: Trends and Dynamics 
Our second dimension of analysis is implementation, i.e. the putting into practice of legislation. 
The forced migrations of 2015 have led to wide-ranging policy initiatives on the level of the 
European Union, as we have already noted, described and analysed in our previous report 
(Karamanidou and Kasparek, 2018). This report complements that particular analysis for the 
level of the EU with a comparative perspective on the policy responses of the 11 RESPOND 
countries as differently ‘affected’ by the migrations of 2015. To this end, we begin by 
highlighting seven trends that are observable on the national level. These trends obviously 




3.2.1. Repeated Introductions of Temporary Schengen-Internal Border 
Controls 
One of the most obvious indication for a return to national policies on border management and 
migration control are the re-introduction of internal border controls in the Schengen area in 
autumn 2017. While in total, nine Schengen states have made use of the provisions in the 
Schengen Borders Code (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Malta, Norway, 
Slovenia and Sweden), due to the scope of this report we will focus on Sweden, Germany, 
and Austria. 
These three countries, whose borders as already noted are largely Schengen-internal borders, 
have opted to reintroduce border controls in autumn 2015, and have since then extended them 
repeatedly. In November 2015, Sweden introduced border controls at its territorial border with 
Denmark under Art. 25 SBC (Borevi and Shakra, 2019, p.7). Notably, these measures were 
combined with national legislation in order to allow for and mandate comprehensive ID-checks 
in these border controls (ibid.). These comprehensive checks were however described as 
‘special measures in the event of serious danger to public order or internal security’ (Borevi 
and Shakra, 2019, p.7), thus specifically echoing the spirit of Art. 25 SBC. In May 2017, this 
practice was discontinued. 
Germany introduced temporary border controls at three highways crossing from Austria into 
Bavaria in September 2015, and has since upheld them. Furthermore, previously existing 
checks in international trains from Austria and in areas near the border have been re-inforced. 
However, it has often been noted that the introduction of border controls at only three sites left 
the vast majority of border crossing from Austria unpoliced (Hänsel, Hess and Kasparek, 
2019). In 2018, these border controls became a controversial issue again not due because of 
their continued existence, but due to a proposal of the Federal Ministry of Interior to refuse 
entry to persons making an asylum claim at the border if another state was responsible for the 
processing of the asylum application under the Dublin regulation. In the end, this practice was 
implemented under bilateral working arrangements with Portugal, Spain, Greece and Italy 
(conclusion still pending - see below) (Hänsel, Hess and Kasparek, 2019). This controversy 
highlights the transformation of rationales of border controls in Germany, from regulating 
access to national territory to a mechanism directed against secondary movements of asylum 
seekers. 
Also in September 2015, the Austrian government introduced systematic internal border 
controls at two major border crossing points towards Slovenia (BCP Spielfeld) and Hungary 
(BCP Nickelsdorf), at the time extensively transited by asylum seekers travelling the Balkan 
route (Josipovic and Reeger, 2019, p.11f.). Austria also referred to Art. 25 SBC. The report 
on Austria notes that an introduction of border controls at the BCP Brennero towards Italy 
was considered and prepared, but not implemented due to protest by the Italian government. 
At the time of writing of this report, all three instances of re-introduced internal border controls 
are ongoing. All three country reports state that the border controls are considered largely 
symbolic and see their role as a function in public discourse (Josipovic and Reeger, 2019, 
p.25). However, the selective nature of these border controls suggests that the underlying 
rationality is not necessarily rooted in a reversal of the Schengen process, i.e. a general and 
all-encompassing re-installation of border control measures along the entire territorial borders 
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of these states. Rather, they constitute specific sites of increased border control and 
surveillance that are situated not along a horizontal territorial border, but along a vertical, 
perpendicular geography of routes of migration. In this vein, the control objective of these 
border controls are not necessarily individual migrants or asylum seekers, but rather the route 
itself, whose re-emergence on a comparable scale to 2015 is thus impeded. Fittingly, all three 
countries now cite the prevention of secondary movement of asylum seekers in the EU as 
core rationales for the prolongation of Schengen-internal border controls. 
3.2.2. Securitisation - Tightening of Border Controls 
Eight of the eleven country reports describe a more general trend of a securitisation and the 
tightening of border controls. With securitisation we refer to a process by which certain 
phenomena and policy fields are increasingly and more dominantly discussed and defined by 
drawing on in/security and risk arguments that transforms leading rationales, actors and 
practices of a given policy field (Bigo 2002). Since 2015 we see in some countries, that this 
goes hand in glove with a deployment of military, and para-military units to the border, a trend 
that will be separately examined. 
Prior to 2015, Turkey’s policy towards refugees from the Syrian civil war was characterised 
by a humanitarian open-door-policy. In 2015 – this is the main trend described by the country 
report – a reversal of this policy came into effect, driven by a logic of securitisation (Gökalp 
Aras and Şahin Mencütek, 2019, p.9). Already in February 2015, the Turkish military carried 
out its first incursion into Syrian territory, followed by larger operations in August 2016 (lasting 
until March 2017), in January 2018 (Gökalp Aras and Şahin Mencütek, 2019., p.20) and 
October 2019. The incursions were part of a larger border security strategy ‘to prevent 
infiltration by ‘militias and terrorist groups’’ (Gökalp Aras and Şahin Mencütek, 2019, p.20.) 
and included the construction of the security wall at the border with Syria which began in 2016 
(Gökalp Aras and Şahin Mencütek, 2019, p.20.). The country report notes that these policy 
reversals were understood as issues of national security, and came into effect independently 
from EU interests (Gökalp Aras and Şahin Mencütek, 2019, p.20). 
However, concerning the Western (maritime) border with Greece, the report notes an 
‘intensification of the collaboration between the EU and Turkey’ in 2015 (Gökalp Aras and 
Şahin Mencütek, 2019, p.20), leading to increased border surveillance in the Aegean through 
the Joint Action Plan (JAP) with the EU of November 29, 2015 (Gökalp Aras and Şahin 
Mencütek, 2019, p.21) and later through the EU-Turkey-Statement of March 2016. Based on 
interviews, the report concludes that both for entry as well as exit points of the Turkish border, 
increased securitisation and increased border control activities can be observed (Gökalp Aras 
and Şahin Mencütek, 2019, p.56). 
For the case of Lebanon, the report describes a long-standing open border policy with Syria 
dating back to the 1990s, which came to an end in October 2014 and was fully reversed in 
January 2015 (Jagarnathsingh, 2019, p.16). While the order of the Lebanese Council of 
Ministers largely impacted residency rights of Syrian refugees, it also led to increased border 
controls and refusal of entries at official border crossing points (Jagarnathsingh, 2019, p.28). 
Not surprisingly, the contemporary specific security measures effected at Lebanon’s border 
with Syria mirror the dynamics of the Syrian civil war (Jagarnathsingh, 2019, p.43). The same 
applies to Iraq, where the report notes that ‘the perception of migration is mostly focussed on 
threats to security driven by the fact that Iraq has been a target for insurgencies and extremists 
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since 2003’ (Warda et. al., 2019, p.22) and extensive efforts have been undertaken to 
introduce biometric technology for the purpose of border controls (Warda et. al., 2019, p.24). 
For the European Union, Hungary constitutes the most clear-cut example of the securitisation 
of borders and the tightening of border controls. Based on a political discourse ‘overwhelmed 
by security-focussed narratives […], the border control regime has been significantly 
expanded since 2015 coupled with an extensive deployment of policy and military personnel’ 
(Gyollai and Korkut, 2019, p.8). The report furthermore concludes that protection needs are 
summarily discarded, with the sole aim of Hungarian border management and migration 
control practices being the prevention of irregular entry into the territory. The measures 
employed include the construction of a fence at the border with Serbia, as well as with Croatia 
(Gyollai and Korkut, 2019, p.18f.), the creation of new border units (Gyollai and Korkut, 2019, 
p.19), legislative changes protecting the very border infrastructure (Gyollai and Korkut, 2019, 
p.19), and the extension of apprehension practices aimed at removal to the entire territory 
(Gyollai and Korkut, 2019, p.22). 
Such policies aiming at tightening border controls under a logic of securitisation can also be 
observed in other EU member states, albeit not as drastic as in the Hungarian case. The re-
introduction of border controls by Germany, Austria and Sweden detailed in the previous 
section certainly falls into this category. Austria notable also introduced harsher punishment 
for acts of irregular entry (Josipovic and Reeger, 2019, p.21), as well as for facilitating irregular 
entry (Josipovic and Reeger, 2019, p.20) while Germany sought to prevent the entry of asylum 
seekers with a very specific interpretation of the Dublin regulation.  
For Poland, the report notes that even though the migrations of 2015 was ‘not directly 
experienced by Poland, it became the point of reference for its law proposals and changes in 
practices aimed at restricting border control’ (Szulecka, 2019, p.15). while new anti-terrorism 
legislation introduced in 2016 also contained provisions concerning foreigners (Szulecka, 
2019, p.30). A similar assessment applies to the UK, where border controls based on pre-
entry measures such as data collection and a draconian visa regime are relied on heavily 
(Karamanidou, 2019, p.7) and where anti-terrorism legislation grants extensive powers to 
‘stop, detain, search and interview’ persons at ports of entry (Karamanidou, 2019, p.19). 
For the case of Italy, the report notes that securitisation has always been central to border 
management and migration control efforts, which translate into an extensive externalisation 
effort in order to limit cross border movements of migrants (Terlizzi, 2019, p.8). This strategy 
has recently been extended to weaken possible channels of even reaching Italian territory, 
leaving NGOs to facilitate access to persons in distress at sea, and even severely criminalising 
such humanitarian efforts (Terlizzi, 2019, p.39). Increased border controls in the North have 
also been noted (Terlizzi, 2019, p.32). 
Securitisation and the tightening of border controls are thus a generalisable trend across all 
country reports examined here. While the result in itself is not necessarily surprising, as we 
discuss in the next section, it is accompanied by an increase in the capabilities of internal 
control regimes. 
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3.2.3. Intensification of Internal Controls, Detention and Return 
As evidenced by the Hungarian case, border controls and internal controls, the latter usually 
aimed at apprehension and facilitation of removal or return of third-country nationals, are 
considered complementary responses to migration. This can be generalised to all countries in 
the scope of this report. Particularly insightful is an assessment from the UK report concerning 
the hostile environment policy of the UK government, i.e. 
a set of measures that were introduced since 2012 in order to create, in the words 
of the then Home Secretary, a ‘hostile environment’ for migrants without legal status 
which would facilitate their detention and removal. It has entailed measures such as 
intensified legal status checks, employment checks and raids, curtailment of access 
to healthcare, accommodation, bank accounts, and driving licenses, and obligations 
of employers, landlords and public bodies to inform immigration authorities. 
(Karamanidou, 2019, p.9 fn 1) 
The report continues to note that ‘the ‘hostile environment’ policy represents a shift towards 
targeting unauthorised stay rather than entry’ (Karamanidou, 2019, p.11). Generally, this 
means that immigration officers have ‘wide-ranging powers to search and arrest persons 
suspected for irregular stay, and to enter and search premises to this aim’ (Karamanidou, 
2019, p.25). Furthermore, the employment sector is considered a ‘key area for internal control 
and apprehension measures’ (Karamanidou, 2019, p.26), while data generated through pre-
entry and at-the-border measures is additionally used to identify migrants without legal status 
of residence (Karamanidou, 2019, p.26). 
This approach also applies, with varying degrees, to the other countries examined in this 
report. The authors of the report on Sweden summarise the two main trends as the 
introduction of a selective control practice at the border, as well as legislative measures to limit 
the access to permanent residence permits for asylum seekers. While the former, especially 
its combination with comprehensive ID-checks, is considered temporary and with a 
reservation for periods of crisis, the replacement of permanent residence permits with 
temporary title of sojourn has a much more long-lasting effect on the refugee population in 
Sweden. The report thus concludes that 
rules regarding the granting of residence status constitute a crucial part of a state’s 
immigration control and border management policies, with a potentially important 
impact both on the numbers and the character of those immigrating to the country. 
(Borevi and Shakra, 2019, p.12) 
The report further states that internal control measures concerning foreigners was considered 
an essential element of migration management on behalf of the Swedish government, which 
in 2017 proposed an expansion of workplace inspections to that effect (Borevi and Shakra, 
2019, p.26f.) Concerning return of migrants and refugees without a permit to sojourn, the 
report finds a tentative increase in return cases (Borevi and Shakra, 2019, p.41), although 
efforts at strengthening return procedures predate the year 2015, evidenced by the so called 
REVA-project aimed at boosting the effectiveness of enforcement of deportations between 
2012 and 2013 (Borevi and Shakra, 2019, p.39). 
Similar developments can be sketched out in the German case. The bulk of legislative and 
policy changes related to migration and asylum are concerned with third-country nationals on 
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the territory of the German state, and not their entry into it. Specifically, through several 
legislative acts after 2015, the German state introduced control measures on asylum seekers, 
such as the obligation to remain in first reception centres for prolonged period of times, the 
increase of rhythm in which specific legal titles have to renewed, replacement of social benefits 
paid out in cash through benefits in kind, accelerated asylum procedures for cases considered 
unjustified or with a small probability of success, re-introduction of residency obligations, and 
removal of obstacles to deportation, amongst others (Hänsel, Hess and Kasparek, 2019, 
p.14ff.). While these measures mostly affected all asylum seekers across the board, the 
introduction of the distinction between asylum seekers who have a high or a low perspective 
or probability of obtaining a residence permit through the asylum system (based on their 
nationality) (Hänsel, Hess and Kasparek, 2019, p.14) led to differentiated treatment of these 
groups of persons. Those with a high probability were often exempted from the new measures. 
While these legislative acts had a sharp impact on all areas of the asylum system, a specifically 
strong focus on extending pre-removal detention, streamlining return procedures and 
increasing effective returns can be observed for Germany (Hänsel, Hess and Kasparek, 2019, 
p.47). 
These findings similarly apply to Austria. While the introduction of a unilateral annual quota 
for asylum applications (Josipovic and Reeger, 2019, p.24f.) may still be characterised as a 
measure aimed at reducing entry into the Austrian territory, other initiatives after 2015 fall 
squarely into a rationale of increased internal control. Amongst these are the introduction of 
new grounds for administrative apprehension (Josipovic and Reeger, 2019, pp.8, 30), 
extended periods of repulsion (Josipovic and Reeger, 2019, p.21) as well as extended 
capacities of establishing a person’s identity (Josipovic and Reeger, 2019, p.21). Furthermore, 
the introduction of detention for asylum seekers deemed ‘dangerous’ is also planned by the 
government (Josipovic and Reeger, 2019, p.13). The report notes that forced returns have 
increased already since 2014 (Josipovic and Reeger, 2019, p.15), the extension of the 
maximum allowed detention period for removal has been increased from six to 18 months 
(Josipovic and Reeger, 2019, p.29), and return centres for rejected asylum seekers have been 
introduced (Josipovic and Reeger, 2019, p.15). Austria is also participating in Joint Return 
Operations organised by Frontex (Josipovic and Reeger, 2019, p.35). 
For Poland, the author of the respective country report notes a political emphasis on restrictive 
measures that include a focus on internal control mechanisms and enforcement of return. The 
author specifically notes how the assessment of the risk that an asylum seeker may abscond 
by the Border Guard leads to an increase in detention during the asylum process (Szulecka, 
2019, p.36), while she concludes that the general trend in Poland seems to be the inclusion 
of ever more spheres of social or economic life into the radius of control (Szulecka, 2019., 
p.69). 
Hungary introduced the so called ‘8km-rule’ in 2016, providing legal grounds for the 
apprehension and ‘escorting’ of irregular migrants to the border with Serbia and their 
subsequent expulsion (Gyollai and Korkut, 2019, p.22). The report qualifies these expulsions 
as factual pushbacks, the rationale being that under Hungary’s asylum law, asylum 
applications may only be lodged in two transit zones. Due to a state of crisis declared in 2015 
(and upheld since), the 8km-rule has been extended to the entire territory of Hungary (Gyollai 
and Korkut, 2019, p.22). Coupled with a rigid criminalisation of ‘activities aiming to facilitate 
the initiation of asylum procedures [sic!] on behalf of individuals who are not exposed to 
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persecution in their country of origin or in the transit countries they travelled through before 
arriving to Hungary’ (Gyollai and Korkut, 2019, p.21), both the right to merely file for asylum 
as well as necessary civil society support for exercising this right have been forcibly 
suspended in lieu of strict control measures. 
Both Italy and Greece constitute outliers in the practices sketched out so far in that they have 
implemented such measures even before 2015. This fact is not surprising since migration 
towards Europe had already started to increase prior to 2015 and was thus experienced by 
those two states. While the Italian report notes an increase of internal controls in the North of 
Italy as well as renewed attempts to enforce deportations more stringently, the Greek report 
notes re-occurring sweep operations of the Greek police targeting migrants without residence 
permits, most notably the operation Xenios Zeus of 2012, which raised the frequency of such 
raids (Ilias et. al., 2019, p.37). The use of geographical restrictions for asylum seekers in the 
hotspot centres can be characterised as an additional internal control measure (Ilias et. al., 
2019, p.11). Through the EU-Turkey-statement and the implied re-activation of both the 
Greek-Turkish readmission protocol of 2002 and the EU-Turkey readmission agreement of 
2013, the Greek state has sought to effect more expulsions of rejected asylum seekers, 
although not to their countries of origin but rather to neighbouring Turkey. 
In the case of Turkey, the introduction of the Temporary Protection Regime (Gökalp Aras and 
Şahin Mencütek, 2019, p.34) for Syrian refugees in 2015 can be characterised as an attempt 
to exert stronger control over settled migrants, while the report more generally notes an 
increase of internal control measures (Gökalp Aras and Şahin Mencütek, 2019, p.47) and 
renewed efforts at expelling Syrian refugees which are intrinsically connected with military 
operations in Northern Syria. 
In the case of Lebanon, the author notes that the internal control regime and related practices 
such as checkpoints have always been stronger than measures of border control and 
surveillance (Jagarnathsingh, 2019, p.19ff.), although these practices have to be understood 
in a larger context of security reinforcement irrespective of migration policy. Similarly, the 
report on Iraq notes the prevalence of checkpoints at entry/exit-points of cities (Warda et. al., 
2019, p.20), affecting especially migrants, but which as a practice may not be attributed to 
migration control efforts solely, but also need to be evaluated within the context of fragile 
internal security in Iraq. 
3.2.4. Actors and Centralisation 
In this subsection, we are assessing organisational trends in national border management and 
migration control. We will highlight new institutions and actors that were created post-2015, 
and assess if the internal cooperation between (state) actors has changed on the national 
level. Military actors as well as bi- or multilateral cooperation will be discussed later.  
Starting with Lebanon, the report does not indicate the creation of new bodies with migration 
management or control competences. Rather, existing institutions were tasked. As already 
noted, the report on Lebanon assesses the general security apparatus as the outcome of a 
‘complex hybridisation’ (Jagarnathsingh, 2019, p.22) between a variety of actors – state and 
non-state actors alike –, and indicates that the resulting ‘surveillance assemblage’ 
(Jagarnathsingh, 2019, p.24) is characterised by the interplay, interdependence and 
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competition between security actors. It furthermore notes that the coordination both within 
individual as well as between different actors is limited (Jagarnathsingh, 2019, p.40f.). 
For Iraq, the country report describes the 2016 creation of the Border Crossings Commission 
(BCC) as an ‘independent commission responsible for improving the quality of services 
provided at border crossings through coordination among all ministries and entities’ (Warda 
et. al., 2019, p.15). Bodies to be coordinated involve a plethora of ministries – most noteworthy 
the Ministry of Interior – as well as the intelligence service. It is directly linked with the Prime 
Minister and manages border crossing points infrastructure (Warda et. al., 2019, p.23). 
However, the report also notes that ‘the lack of [a] clear legal and regulatory framework in the 
public domain is a serious problem’ (Warda et. al., 2019, p.24), especially for those bodies 
tasked with the implementation and enforcement of legal provisions. This problem is further 
compounded by the existence of a multiplicity of actors involved, many of which are part of 
the Ministry of Interior (Warda et. al., 2019, p.25). Clearly, the creation of the BCC is an attempt 
at improved coordination of these bodies. 
In Turkey, attempts to reorganise state institutions tasked with border management and 
migration control have begun much earlier than 2015, a development which can be attributed 
to the EU accession process and its aim to create compatible institutions. The country reports’ 
section on actors mentions over 20 actors involved, of which principle coordination roles 
belong to such different kind of institutions such as the Turkish Armed Forces, the Ministry of 
the Interior with its sub-bodies Gendarmerie, Coast Guard, Directorate General of Security, 
Department of Border Management and the Directorate General of Migration, as well as the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Gökalp Aras and Şahin Mencütek, 2019, p.48). Furthermore, there 
are more civilian bodies such as the Directorate General of Migration Management (Gökalp 
Aras and Şahin Mencütek, 2019, p.50) established in 2013 and international organizations like 
the UNHCR, also tasked with coordinating roles. Many bodies have undergone 
transformations in name and role over the last two decades (Gökalp Aras and Şahin 
Mencütek, 2019, p.51). Given Turkey’s recent constitutional pivot to a presidential system and 
the publicly visible role that President Erdoğan has taken on concerning migration policies, 
one must assume that the ultimate coordination of border and migration policies lies with the 
upper echelons of the Turkish executive. It is however unclear if this constitutes a decisive 
change to prior arrangements. 
For the cases of EU member states, Greece is the country that undertook the most drastic 
efforts (at least on paper) to reorganise its institutions tasked with border management and 
migration control. Again, these efforts date back much further than 2015, and have their origin 
in the europeanisation of migration and border policies, albeit in a delayed manner. The pivotal 
year appears to be 2011, when the entire asylum system was reorganised and both the Greek 
Asylum Service as well as the First Reception Service was created (Ilias et. al., 2019, p.7) and 
an Integrated Border Management Program for Combating Illegal Immigration was adopted 
(Ilias et. al., 2019, p.10). However, the latter rather saw the intensification of control activities 
by existing bodies, increased cooperation with EU actors such as Frontex, but no decisive 
reorganisation of ministerial competences. Only in 2014, the National Coordination Centre for 
Border Control, Immigration and Asylum was created in order to provide the National Border 
Surveillance System as the national counterpart of EUROSUR and to facilitate information 
exchange between agencies tasked with migration and asylum (Ilias et. al., 2019, p.24). Only 
in January 2015, an alternate Ministry of Migration under the Ministry of Interior (a more 
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administrative ministry and thus not comparable with other national MOIs) was established, 
even though it remained large decoupled from security actors such as the Greek Police, Greek 
Border Guard (both under the de facto Ministry of Interior called Ministry of Citizen Protection) 
and the Greek Coast Guard (under the ministry of merchant marine). Notably, the adoption of 
the hotspot approach in Greece did not coincide with any reorganisation or creation of actors. 
For Italy, the report notes a veritable plethora of actors (Terlizzi, 2019, p.28ff.), whose origins 
must be sought for one in the existence of several police bodies with at times overlapping 
jurisdictions, as well as the federal structure of the Italian state. However, no indication of a 
reorganisation, creation of coordination bodies or centralisation of competences is given in the 
report. 
Much differently, the response of the Austrian state to the migrations of 2015 saw not only 
the creation of a new specialised border police unit called PUMA (Josipovic and Reeger, 2019, 
p.12), but also the establishment of a new directorate (Directorate V Aliens Division) in the 
Ministry of Interior, ‘tying together the subjects of ‘citizenship and residence’, ‘borders and 
aliens police’, as well as ‘asylum and return’’ (Josipovic and Reeger, 2019, p.15). However, 
the report offers no evidence for increased inter-ministerial coordination. 
Both Germany and Sweden did not respond with decisive organisational measures. The 
report for Sweden does however mention that in 2016, a Swedish national strategy for 
integrated border management was established, bringing together police, national migration 
agency, different maritime agencies, customs and the Swedish security service (Borevi and 
Shakra, 2019, p.25). Given the criticism Sweden received through the Schengen evaluation 
mechanism in 2018, inter-actor coordination seems insufficient (Borevi and Shakra, 2019, 
p.36). For Germany, the creation of the Bavarian Border Police in 2017 is noteworthy, 
although this new institution has been widely regarded as a mere publicity stunt since the 
federal structure of Germany does not allow for the transfer of executive border control 
competences to such regional bodies. 
Hungary again falls squarely into a different category concerning actors and their 
coordination. Already in 2016, the government recruited 3.000 ‘border hunters’ in order to 
offset the capacity shortages of the national police (Gyollai and Korkut, 2019, p.19). They were 
integrated into the Riot Police Border Policing Directorate, itself only established in 2015 
(Gyollai and Korkut, 2019, pp.19, 34). Coordination between the army and police in matters of 
border control has been facilitated through a 2015 joint ministerial order (Gyollai and Korkut, 
2019, p.37f.), and a national coordination centre at the National Police Headquarters acts as 
the national counterpart for Eurosur (Gyollai and Korkut, 2019, p.17). At the same time, NGOs 
as non-state actors have been largely excluded. 
Both the UK and Poland as countries not directly affected by migrations of 2015 saw little 
organisational change. The UK’s border management and migration control system is – as 
previously stated – characterised by a high level of complexity, which extends to the quantity 
of actors involved, since 2016 also tasking public bodies, such as the Department of Education 
and its agencies as well as the National Health Service to cooperation with the Home Office 
in matters of migration control (Karamanidou, 2019, p.12). As for Poland, 2012 saw the 
creation of an inter-ministerial task force to set migration policy (Szulecka, 2019, p.15), in 
2014, the competences of the Border Guard in the execution of migration-related sanctions 
were strengthened (Szulecka, 2019, p.23), while coordination amongst governmental bodies 
seems to be without serious shortcomings (Szulecka, 2019, p.67). 
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3.2.4.1. Increased Involvement of Military Actors 
That the armed forces play an increasingly important role in Turkish border management and 
migration control has already been noted in the preceding subsection. Still, the repeated 
incursions of the Turkish military into Northern Syria between 2015 and 2019 have been 
explicitly justified with reference to migration management, i.e. the planned repatriation of up 
to three million Syrian refugees from Turkey to purportedly safe zones in Northern Syria to be 
created through the military intervention (Gökalp Aras and Şahin Mencütek, 2019, p.20). 
Furthermore, the authors of the report note a specific ‘military-humanitarian nexus’ (Gökalp 
Aras and Şahin Mencütek, 2019, p.55), quoting President Erdoğan in 2018 as seeing border 
security and the expansion of military operations beyond Turkey’s borders as intrinsically 
linked (Gökalp Aras and Şahin Mencütek, 2019, p.55). The involvement of the Turkish navy 
in the aforementioned NATO deployment in the Aegean remains unclear, however, the report 
notes that the NATO-base in İzmir plays an important role. 
In Lebanon, the Supreme Defence Council in 2019 ordered both security and military forces 
to guard land borders in order to control irregular entry of Syrians into Lebanon 
(Jagarnathsingh, 2019, p.40), although a trend towards militarised borders that goes hand in 
glove with restrictions in migration policies has been observed since 2014 (Jagarnathsingh, 
2019, p.12f.). However, we can also find the military-humanitarian nexus especially against 
the background of the no-camp-policy by the government which leaves much space for non-
state actors linked to different militias and armed groups to provide shelter and care. 
For Iraq, the explicit involvement of military units in border management cannot be established 
from the report, with the exception of the navy’s involvement of maritime border surveillance 
(Warda et. al., 2019, p.19). However, the military is involved in running internal checkpoints. 
In Hungary, an overwhelming trend of militarisation can be observed. The report notes that in 
2008, the Border Guard Force became the Border Police, thus losing its initial ‘militarist 
identity’ (Gyollai and Korkut, 2019, p.17). This was however reversed with the creation of the 
border hunters units in 2016: 
Dsupin and Kónya note that the name Határvadász (‘Border-hunter’) has been 
chosen for the military connotation of the term and its historical legacy, and not to 
suggest the unit would have an actual hunting role, that is, ‘it is meant to carry the 
memory of those soldiers and military organisations who heroically defended the 
historical borders of Hungary against the advancing Soviet troops during World War 
II’. (Gyollai and Korkut, 2019, p.19f.) 
Furthermore, not only can the army be deployed in border controls, in ‘crisis situations caused 
by mass migration’ the army may even be called upon to aid in the registration of asylum 
seekers (Gyollai and Korkut, 2019, p.20). 
In addition, Austria resorted to the deployment of military units much more strongly, deploying 
soldiers in an assisting capacity for border controls (Josipovic and Reeger, 2019, p.17) and at 
the Brenner border crossing point directly adjacently to Italy (Josipovic and Reeger, 2019, 
p.12). In Greece, the army played an import initial role in setting up refugee camps, the hotspot 
centres, as well as running the logistical processes connected with these infrastructures (Ilias 
et. al., 2019, p.53). 
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For Italy, the deployment of the navy in the military-humanitarian operation Mare Nostrum, a 
humanitarian-military search and rescue effort between October 2013 and November 2014 is 
to be noted, whereas interestingly the military didn’t play a big role in the emergency situations 
of the following years when in 2016 and 2017 the numbers of sea arrivals were rising. 
3.2.5 New (Border) Infrastructures: Hardening of the Border 
Turning from actors to infrastructure, various reports note the installation of new highly material 
border infrastructure and surveillance technologies as well as the creation of new kind of 
centres for refugees. 
Turkey replaced the existing border fencing at the Syrian border with a concrete ‘security wall’ 
in 2016, stretching nearly 900 km (Gökalp Aras and Şahin Mencütek, 2019, p.31). It is not 
merely a material obstacle, but features the extensive use of border surveillance technology 
through its ‘integrated border security system’. Already in 2011, Greece began the 
construction of a fence at its North-Eastern land border with Turkey (Ilias et. al., 2019, p.24), 
also featuring technological equipment. Hungary has constructed 175 km of fencing at its 
border with Serbia, as well as another 116 km at its border with Croatia (Gyollai and Korkut, 
2019, p.18f.). Initiatives to add such fencing to the border with Romania and Slovenia 
respectively did not come to fruition. However, a law introduced new criminal offences in 
relation with the materiality of the fence, i.e. causing damage or obstructing its construction 
(Gyollai and Korkut, 2019, p.19). Austria in 2016 constructed a fence at the border crossing 
point Spielfeld-Sentilj with Slovenia and introduced systematic border controls at the Brenner 
Pass with additional barbed wire fences kept in containers (Josipovic and Reger 2019, p. 10f.). 
Concerning camp infrastructures, a variety of concepts has been implemented throughout 
Europe. The mixed identification, registration and detention infrastructures of the hotspot 
centres in Greece and Italy have already been noted. Hungary introduced so called transit 
zones at its border with Serbia, which constitute the only site where asylum applications may 
be lodged, even though entry into the transit zones from Serbia is heavily controlled (Gyollai 
and Korkut, 2019, p.12). In Austria, former reception centres were repurposed as ‘return 
centres’, which are not detention centres, but impose restrictions of movement both legally 
and through their placement in remote locations of the country (Josipovic and Reeger, 2019, 
p.28). Germany introduced so called first-reception centres and ANKER-centres, 
i.e. integrated facilities that combine functions of reception, asylum processing and facilitation 
of deportation (Hänsel, Hess and Kasparek, 2019, p.28f.). 
3.2.6 Cooperation 
While the former section dealt with developments and trends within the countries studied for 
this report, this section will focus on various forms of cooperation. Bilateral cooperation is 
usually understood as cooperation with neighbouring countries; however, there are certain 
bilateral working agreements within the EU that will also be covered by this category. Under 
multilateral cooperation, we mostly understand regional cooperation involving more than just 
two states. Even though we have already explored EU mechanisms (Karamanidou and 
Kasparek, 2018), we also cover the European level in the sense of inter-level cooperation, 
i.e. between specific EU actors and member states. Finally, we cover relations between the 
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EU or its institutions with third countries, externalisation and cooperation of non-member 
states. 
3.2.6.1 Bilateral cooperation 
The UK, due to its status outside of Schengen, has long pioneered bilateral cooperation 
mechanisms in border control with France and Belgium. The so-called juxtaposed controls 
date back to 1991, and allow for the exchange of immigration officers to conduct checks and 
controls on the juxtaposed territory (Karamanidou, 2019, p.17ff.). Notably, these officers act 
independently, but in cooperation with the nation state’s institutions they are deployed to, thus 
surpassing e.g. the competences transferred to guest officers in Frontex Joint Operations. 
Austria similarly attempted to increase border police cooperation with neighbouring countries, 
such as Italy, Hungary and states of the Western Balkans. Excluding the case of trilateral 
patrols which will be discussed in the following section, these efforts however not seem to 
include the exchange or the deployment of police officers, but rather focus on cooperation and 
data exchange mechanisms (Josipovic and Reeger, 2019, p.14).  
Different in nature are the working arrangements that Germany has concluded with three EU 
member states since 2018. In reference to Art. 36 of the Dublin regulation, which allows for 
bilateral administrative arrangements to ‘facilitate its application and increase its 
effectiveness’, such arrangements have been concluded with Portugal, Spain and Greece, 
while the conclusion of such an arrangement with Italy is still pending to date (Hänsel, Hess 
and Kasparek, 2019, p.39f.). In a peculiar interpretation of the Dublin system, Germany utilises 
these arrangements to apprehend asylum seekers at Germany’s borders that have already 
lodged a previous asylum application in one of these countries and returns them to their 
jurisdiction. The argument put forward by Germany is that these working arrangements 
facilitate the application of the Dublin responsibility determination system, while critical voices 
find this argument legally dubious (Hänsel, Hess and Kasparek, 2019, p.39f.). Additionally, 
Germany has several bilateral police cooperation and takes part in the trilateral border control 
units along the Brenner route.  
3.2.6.2 Multilateral cooperation 
Multilateral, i.e. regional cooperation mechanisms seem to be much more common than 
bilateral agreements, even though in interviews carried out for the report on Germany, officials 
of the Ministry of Interior pointed out that bilateral arrangements still play an important role in 
the day-to-day cooperation at Schengen internal borders. 
The report on Sweden notes the Baltic Sea Region Border Control Cooperation (BSRBCC) 
where information is shared and common actions are implemented (Borevi and Shakra, 2019, 
p.35). The report further references synchronised air patrols of coast guard institutions 
between Sweden, Finland, Denmark, and Germany (Borevi and Shakra, 2019, p.35). 
Hungary participates in several fora, such as in the Police Cooperation Convention for 
Southeast Europe (Gyollai and Korkut, 2019, p.18), which exists since 2007 and like the 
BSRBCC does not merely include EU member states. Hungary, along with Austria, 
participates in the Salzburg Forum, described as a ‘Central European security partnership’ 
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since 2000. While the Visegrad Group appears in both reports on Poland and Hungary, the 
group is better understood as a political coordination mechanism. 
A very specific form of cooperation are the so-called trilateral police cooperations that exist 
between a) Italy, Austria and Germany and b) Germany, Austria and Hungary. In these 
forms of cooperation, police officers of the three participating states carry out controls together, 
either in Hungary or Italy respectively, or in trains and along highways transiting the 
participating states (Hänsel, Hess and Kasparek, 2019, p.42f.; Gyollai and Korkut, 2019, 
p.37ff.). 
3.2.6.3 European Level 
Concerning the interactions between the European level and the member state level, we 
highlight two different categories: a) the involvement of European agencies in border 
management and migration control efforts, and b) the influence of European mechanisms on 
member state policy implementation. 
For the first category, the European Border and Coast Guard Agency Frontex is the most 
salient instance. Given the mandate of the agency (Karamanidou and Kasparek, 2018), it has 
the strongest impact in member states that are policing a large portion of the European 
external border, i.e. in this report, Greece, Hungary and Italy. Even though Poland also 
shares a large part of the European external border towards the East, and also happens to 
host the agency’s headquarter, the activities of the agency are not particularly noted in the 
report on Poland. This finding is consistent with the agency’s approach of selective bordering, 
i.e. initiating operations at parts of the European external border where there is a need to 
reinforce national member state efforts at policing the border due to increased migration. 
However, Poland does support Frontex operations with staff and technical equipment 
(Szulecka, 2019, p.31). Thus, despite the Polish geographical context, Poland falls into a 
category of member states whose border guard institutions are deployed in other member 
states (and since 2016 also in third countries) through Frontex operations. This category also 
includes Germany (Hänsel, Hess and Kasparek, 2019, p.31f.), Austria (Josipovic and 
Reeger, 2019, p.18), the UK on a case by case basis (Karamanidou, 2019, pp.20, 38) given 
its special status within the Schengen cooperation. Italy also participates in Frontex 
operations, although the respective report does not indicate if Italy is acting as a host country, 
or a contributor to operations in other jurisdictions (Terlizzi, 2019, p.20). The same applies to 
Greece (Ilias et. al., 2019, p.26), which also hosts a Frontex Operational Office in the port of 
Pireas (Ilias et. al., 2019, p.26). 
Hungary saw a large deployment of Frontex personnel (i.e. agency staff and seconded 
national officers) since 2015. The report on Hungary notes the integrated character of the 
Frontex operation with national border policing efforts, such as continuous information sharing 
and joint patrol activities (Gyollai and Korkut, 2019, p.38f.). 
The most continuous and long-lasting deployment of Frontex personnel can be observed 
under the hotspot approach, i.e. in the hotspot registration centres in both Greece (Ilias et. al., 
2019, p.27ff.,53) and Italy (Terlizzi, 2019, p.21). There, Frontex mostly provides pre-
registration screening, nationality identification and fingerprinting. While the report on Italy 
notes the lack of a solid legal basis for the operation of the hotspots, referencing the mere 
existence of standard operating procedures (Terlizzi, 2019, p.36), the report on Greece 
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underlines the fact that through the reforms of the Greek asylum system since 2011, a legal 
basis had been de facto created even before the announcement of the hotspot approach by 
the European commission in 2015 (Ilias et. al., 2019, p.27). 
For both Italy and Greece, a long presence of Frontex through various operations can be 
noted, dating back to at least 2006, when Joint Operation Poseidon (Greece) and Joint 
Operation Nautilus (Italy and Malta) were initiated. Such operations, which usually encompass 
patrol activities, complement the presence of Frontex in the hotspots. Politically, the strong 
engagement of Frontex in those two member states mirrors the respective national political 
discourses which emphasise burden sharing and solidarity within the EU in migration and 
border policies (Ilias et. al., 2019, p.42; Terlizzi, 2019, p.8). 
Until 2016, the agency did not have the mandate to operate in third countries. 
For the second category of interaction between the EU and member states, we highlight the 
impact that the Schengen evaluation mechanism (Karamanidou and Kasparek, 2018) has on 
member state policy implementation. 
Sweden received harsh criticism through the Schengen evaluation mechanism in 2018: 
The report was particularly critical towards the lack of enough coordination between 
different actors involved in border control; the lack of a national system for quality 
control or supervision and the fact that there was no defined decision chain between 
border police actors operating on the national, regional and local levels (Borevi and 
Shakra, 2019, p.36) 
According to the country report, this evaluation triggered a national political debate after it was 
leaked to the public, and the government has since vowed the remedy the shortcomings 
(Borevi and Shakra, 2019, p.36). 
Similarly, Greece already in 2015 was the subject of a critical report of the Commission, citing 
several shortcomings in terms of border controls at external borders (Ilias et. al., 2019, p.50). 
The country report does not indicate specific measures that the Greek government undertook 
to address these criticisms. 
3.2.6.4 Cooperation with non-EU member states 
Turning to interactions between the EU and third countries, we begin with Turkey. Given the 
accession process, a strong influence of EU policies on Turkey can be observed. In this vein, 
the country report notes that especially concerning Turkey’s Western borders, ‘the most 
significant developments since 2011 at these borders are linked with the EU’ (Gökalp Aras 
and Şahin Mencütek, 2019, p.20), a collaboration that was intensified in 2015. Notably, the 
report indicates that this collaboration often took the form of tailored bilateral agreements, such 
as the 2012 Memorandum of Understanding with Frontex (Gökalp Aras and Şahin Mencütek, 
2019, p.25), the 2013 EU-Turkey readmission protocol, the 2015 Joint Action Plan and of 
course the 2016 EU-Turkey statement (Gökalp Aras and Şahin Mencütek, 2019, p.21). 
However, the instability of these instruments, particularly the gap between policy and 
implementation, needs to be noted. For example, the long awaited and promised visa 
liberalisation has so far seen no progress (Gökalp Aras and Şahin Mencütek, 2019, p.22). 
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Furthermore, the report concludes that as an actor ‘on the ground’, the EU is not as visible as 
e.g. the UNHCR (Gökalp Aras and Şahin Mencütek, 2019, p.83). 
The country report on Lebanon notes mostly financing packages provided by the EU to 
Lebanon, mostly through the instrument of the European Neighbourhood Policy 
(Jagarnathsingh, 2019, p.41ff.). The report further notes financing for a project on integrated 
border management, although this is out-sourced to the ICMPD, and the particular outcomes 
of this project were not clear at the time of writing. Concerning close cooperation with EU 
actors, the report indicated room for improvement. 
Concerning Iraq, the report notes the EU-Iraqi Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, which 
was concluded in 2012, although the specific contents, and especially initiatives related to 
border management and migration control are not clear (Warda et. al., 2019, p.9). 
3.2.7 Human Rights and Deprivation of Rights 
The last development to pick up on in this section are the transformations that fundamental 
rights and international law are undergoing. In this, we do not look at formal processes such 
as jurisprudence, but the practices around their invocation, or respectively contexts 
characterised by insufficient respect for fundamental rights. 
3.2.7.1. Pushbacks and Refusal of Entry 
Alarmingly, in the majority of reports that form the base for this comparative reports, we find 
instances of refoulement, or pushbacks, illegal under the Geneva Refugee Convention and 
international customary law, or ‘legal devices’ that allow for a seemingly legitimate refusal of 
entry or expulsion after apprehension in cases when a person clearly states the intent to apply 
for asylum. 
The report on Turkey notes that ‘[p]ush-backs are a longstanding policy tool and practice used 
by Turkish authorities, especially at the sea borders, in particular at the Aegean Sea, but also 
these practices exist in the land borders’ (Gökalp Aras and Şahin Mencütek, 2019, p.64ff.). 
The report continues to cite evidence at large-scale pushbacks at the Syrian border that also 
involve the use of force, resulting in refugee deaths. The report on Iraq notes instances of 
denial of entry for Syrian citizens of Arab origin in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, for which on 
the side of Iraq the border police of the Anbar governorate is deemed responsible (Warda et. 
al., 2019, p.24). For Lebanon, the militarisation and securitisation of the border with Syria has 
already been noted, which translated directly into refusals of entry for Syrian nationals: 
‘Following this decision [in 2014], the General Directorate of General Security enforced new, 
restrictive immigration controls […], which in effect shut down the borders with Syria for the 
majority of Syrian refugees in Lebanon’ (Jagarnathsingh, 2019, p.27). However, neither 
Lebanon nor Iraq have yet signed the 1951 Geneva Refugee Convention, while Turkey still 
maintains the original geographical restriction. Therefore, technically, the non-refoulement 
principle as formulated by the Refugee Convention is not directly applicable, even though 
Turkey is still bound by international customary law. 
In the EU context, the non-refoulement principle is directly applicable, and also reaffirmed 
through multiple items of legislation and treaties. This makes the recent increase in pushback 
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practices as documented by the report an urgent issue. This holds especially true where such 
practices have been long ongoing and have been thoroughly documented. 
A case in point is the particular practice of the Polish Border Guards at Terespol border 
crossing point with Belarus, and to a smaller extent at the Medyka border crossing point with 
Ukraine. The report on Poland notes a longstanding practice of refusal of entry even for 
persons showing intent to apply for international protection, since the border guards often 
judge these claims as ‘bogus’ and thus directly refuse entry into Polish territory (Szulecka, 
2019, pp.45, 53ff.,69). The report on Greece notes that pushback practices both at maritime 
as well as territorial borders have long been documented, especially for the Evros region (e.g. 
Council of Europe, 2018; ARSIS, Greek Council for Refugees and HumanRights360, 2018; 
Greek Council for Refugees, 2018). Unlike in the Polish case, where the described practices 
are carried out in the open, in the Greek case, the authorities involved seem to act in a more 
clandestine manner, which has complicated the adjudication of the fundamental rights 
violations in national and international courts (Ilias et. al., 2019, p.48). 
The Hungarian 8km-rule and its extension to the entire national territory, which has already 
been described above, constitutes a prime example of a ‘legal device’ legitimising pushbacks 
to Serbia under the guise of facilitating the lodging of an asylum application at an ‘appropriate’ 
site, i.e. the two transit zones at the border. Similarly, the Dublin administrative arrangements 
that Germany has concluded purport to form a legal basis that in practice pre-empt the lodging 
of an asylum application in specific cases. 
For Italy, the report notes occurrences of pushbacks towards Slovenia (Terlizzi, 2019, p.32). 
However, in the context of a discussion of respect for fundamental rights and international law 
such as the Geneva Refugee Convention, the multifarious practices of non-assistance and 
negligence occurring in the Mediterranean would necessitate a separate and detailed 
discussion. 
3.2.7.2 Detention 
Although largely described in the preceding sections, the expansion of detention as a 
mechanism of migration control should be highlighted on its own. Detention, which in the 
context of this discussion we understand exclusively as administrative restrictions of liberty as 
opposed to criminal punishment, occurs mainly under two rationales, i.e. a) during the 
processing of asylum claims and b) as a preparatory measure for forced return. 
Hungary was the first EU member state to introduce the possible detention of asylum seekers 
during the asylum process in 2013 (Gyollai and Korkut, 2019, p.24). In 2014 and 2015, the 
report notes that the existing asylum detention centres were operating at full capacity, 
necessitating an expansion (Gyollai and Korkut, 2019, p.25). However, with the introduction 
of the 8km-rule and the consistently applied practice of expelling asylum seekers across the 
border with Serbia, the use of asylum detention has considerably dropped (Gyollai and Korkut, 
2019, p.25). Still, the few asylum seekers that do actually obtain access to one of the two 
transit zones where asylum applications may be lodged do still find themselves under 
deprivation of liberty. The Hungarian government argues that since any person is free to leave 
the transit zone to Serbia at any time, there is no detention in transit zones. In March 2017, 
the ECtHR has however ruled that ‘holding asylum seekers in these facilities constituted 
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arbitrary deprivation of liberty in the meaning of Art 5 of the ECHR’ (Gyollai and Korkut, 2019, 
p.26). The case has since been referred to the Grand Chamber of the ECtHR and is still 
pending. The Hungarian case is a striking example for the production of legal ambiguity 
through legislation that we have already noted with reference to refusals of entry. 
Germany has since 2015 started to expand pre-removal detention capacities, since the 
existing facilities are considered inadequate und undersized (Hänsel, Hess and Kasparek, 
2019, p.40). Lawyers and NGOs however have argued that in many cases, the decision to 
detain taken by foreigners’ authorities have been found unlawful by courts (Hänsel, Hess and 
Kasparek, 2019, p.41f.,47), thus pointing to a tendency to impose detention without due 
consideration of the law and implicit human rights. 
In Greece, both typologies of detention, i.e. detention of asylum seekers and people seeking 
to apply for asylum as well as pre-removal detention can be observed, and not only since 
2015. The concrete practice of detention is regionally differentiated, the report on Greece 
mentions detention in police holding cells mainly for the Evros land border (Ilias et. al., 2019, 
p.55), while certain and changing forms of restriction of liberty or movement (the latter cannot 
be categorised as detention) apply especially on the hotspot islands (Ilias et. al., 2019, p.56). 
In addition, there exist nine pre-removal detention centres (Ilias et. al., 2019, p.58), of which 
three are located on East-Aegean islands and that were established after the EU-Turkey-
statement through a pilot project (Ilias et. al., 2019, p.54). The report notes an increasing and 
excessive use of detention (Ilias et. al., 2019, p.57), despite initial attempts of the government 
in 2015 to limit the use of detention (Ilias et. al., 2019, p.10). 
Similarly, in the UK detention has long been a pillar of migration governance, especially in 
connection with the ‘hostile environment’ policy. UK legislation allows for the detention of 
asylum seekers during the process as well as pre-removal detention (Karamanidou, 2019, 
p.23) without a statutory limit to its duration (Karamanidou, 2019, p.24). Often, the actual 
running of detention centres is outsourced to for-profit entities (Karamanidou, 2019, p.12), 
while also prisons are used (Karamanidou, 2019, p.31). 
For the case of Lebanon, the report describes a long continuity of the use of detention in 
migration governance. Given that a vast majority of displaced persons reside in Lebanon 
without a legal status (Jagarnathsingh, 2019, p.33), and that detention is usually mandated 
throughout all judicial stages concerning irregular entry or residence (Jagarnathsingh, 2019, 
p.19), detention of foreigners is a wide-spread practice: ‘refugees and migrants are prone to 
arrest and detention, notably at the country’s many checkpoints’ (Jagarnathsingh, 2019, p.33). 
Despite a formal legal basis for detention, the report notes that the actual conditions and length 
of detention is often at the discretion of government authorities: ‘In reality, migrants in 
particular have been systematically reported to be confined in prolonged, and often unjustified, 
administrative detention for years, sometimes in spite of condemnations by the judiciary’ 
(Jagarnathsingh, 2019, p.20). It is noteworthy that the most effective tool for correcting 
measures of arbitrary detention seems to stem from international law which can be mobilised 
in national courts (Jagarnathsingh, 2019, p.20f.). 
For Austria, the respective country report notes that detention provisions were tightened after 
2015, the maximum duration was increased to the limit allowed for by EU legislation, new 
grounds for detention were introduced and new detention infrastructure was constructed 
(Josipovic and Reeger, 2019, p.28). For Italy, the report highlights the lack of a legal basis for 
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the running of the hotspots centres (Terlizzi, 2019, p.36). Consequently, the report notes that 
there are allegations that migrants are detained without a court order (Terlizzi, 2019, p.37). 
3.3 Central Themes and Narratives 
The third dimension of analysis explores narratives employed in legitimising policy change. 
We focus on three narratives that are common among most of the EU member states within 
the scope of this report: securitised constructions of migration as a threat, narratives around 
the perceived necessity of border controls, and narratives around humanitarianism and 
security.  
3.1. Securitisation – Migration as a Threat  
Securitising narratives, constructing migration as threatening, are evident in all selected 
countries. A first theme, present in narratives in all selected countries, concerns security 
threats such as crime and terrorism: 
The cost to the UK of undocumented passengers can be high as many go on to 
claim asylum. There can also be a security risk as individuals wishing to come 
here for organised crime of terrorism purposes may view this as a potential method 
of entry (Home Office 2013, cited in Karamanidou, 2019) 
We do not want to see what the migrant communities of Western Europe bring: 
terror, public insecurities, the feeling of safety and comfort of being at home that 
the native nations would feel at the face of migration (Orban 2018, cited in Gyollai 
and Korkut, 2019) 
Similarly, in Austria, Italy and Germany migrants are designated as ‘dangerous’ through their 
perceived association with crime while in a Swedish government bill, ‘large inflows of asylum 
seekers’ are depicted as threatening ‘the public order and internal security’ of Swedish society 
(Government Bill 2015/16:67, cited in Borevi and Shakra, 2019). This argument especially 
appears in relation with a description of the external border controls as insufficient, ‘with the 
risk that potential terrorists enter the Schengen area’ (Borevi and Shakra, 2019, 14) 
A second theme depicts migratory movements as destabilising the national order of societal 
organisation and welfare. In the UK, Germany and Sweden, narratives also posit migration 
movements as threatening for social cohesion and the broader well-being of society. 
According to the UK prime minister, migration has negative effects on ‘on social cohesion, on 
our infrastructure and public services, and on jobs and wages’ (2012, cited in Karamanidou, 
2019); an interviewee in Germany argued that it ‘is ultimately about not over-stretching the 
willingness and capability of society and the state to receive immigrants. Because doing so 
leads to a destabilization of the community…’ (Interview B, cited in Hänsel, Hess and 
Kasparek, 2019). Likewise, in the case of Sweden ‘societal functionality´ is defined as part of 
national `security’ (Government bill 2015/16:67, cited in Borevi and Shakra, 2019). 
A different, more racially inscribed argument can be observed in Hungary and Poland where 
migratory movements are depicted as a threat to cultural and national identity. V. Orban, for 
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example stated that ‘we do not want to become a nation of migrants’ (2018, cited in Gyollai 
and Korkut, 2019) and that ‘the European people can be exchanged with migrants. […] The 
nation, the national identity and national feeling are negative and considered as dying […] 
(Orban 2018, cited in Gyollai and Korkut, 2019). In Poland, constructions of threat evolved 
around religion and the perceived incompatibility between Islam and Christianity, a theme also 
present in Hungary (Gyollai and Korkut, 2019; Szulecka, 2019). The perceived threats to 
identity were linked primarily to the 2015 migratory movements, which were seen as 
uncontrolled (Gyollai and Korkut, 2019; Szulecka, 2019). However, in the case of Poland and 
Hungary in particular, perceived threats to identity have permeated narratives in response to 
2015 (Podgórzańska, 2019; Thorleifsson, 2017). Further, the intensity of threat-construction 
in Poland and Hungary, evolving around issues of identity but also Euroscepticism and hostility 
to Europeanisation (Gyollai and Korkut, 2019; Szulecka, 2019) reflects to a large extent the 
impact of the right-populist politicisation of migration (Börzel and Risse, 2018). 
In short, the analysis of narratives in the selected countries reaffirms the extent to which 
securitising discourses have dominated the political and public debates, especially in a 
heightened degree since 2015 (see also Ceccorulli, 2019; Krzyżanowski, Triandafyllidou and 
Wodak, 2018; Thorleifsson, 2017; Triandafyllidou, 2018).  
3.2. Border and Migration Control  
Controlling the border and migration are constructed as the solution for addressing the 
perceived threats presented by migratory movements in all selected countries. According to a 
Home Office press release 
A safe and secure border means not just better immigration control, but safer 
streets and more secure citizens. There can be no compromises on border 
security. In a dangerous world, our border is one of our main protections (Home 
Office 2012c). 
Similarly, according to a representative by the Federal police in Germany, controlling the 
border is an integral part of an ‘integrated migration management-strategy’ and necessary for 
‘securing or maintaining social cohesion’ (interview B, cited in Hänsel, Hess and Kasparek, 
2019),. Such statements articulate a necessity and inevitability of controlling the border which 
is constructed as a protective institution vis-a-vis the national social state (Vollmer, 2017; 
Yuval–Davis, Wemyss and Cassidy, 2019). Only one quotation from the Minister of Citizen 
Protection in Greece admitting that ‘the fences and the walls cannot stop the flows of the 
forced moving populations’ (2017, cited in Ilias et. al., 2019), suggests a different 
understanding. However, the same actor stated that ‘this does not mean that Europe can and 
must pursue a policy of ‘open’ or ‘fluid’ borders’ (Ministry of Citizen Protection, 2017, cited in 
Ilias et. al., 2019). 
The external border of the Union, and the perceived deficiencies in its control are the focus of 
border narratives in Germany, Hungary, Poland, Greece and Sweden. 
There are still deficiencies in the controls of the external borders across the 
Schengen area, which means Sweden must keep the internal border controls. 
(Government 2019, cited in Borevi and Shakra, 2019) 
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When we defend our borders, we do not only do something for Hungary, not only protect 
Hungary’s interests, but the whole, everyone who is behind us, that is, the whole Europe. 
Those EU member states, which fail to defend the European borders, are the ones that 
fail to maintain solidarity with the other European Union member states. We expect that 
they should not allege us with failing the European solidarity and talk about lack of 
solidarity [when they mention] Hungary (Orban 2016, cited in Gyollai and Korkut, 2019) 
The emphasis on controlling the border – and in particular the external borders of the EU 
evokes both constructions of national sovereignty and solidarity. Political narratives in the UK 
construct the control of its borders as primarily an exercise in national sovereignty, not a 
common, europeanised area of responsibility. In the words of Theresa May, the ‘problem’ of 
the 2015 migratory movements ‘can only be resolved by nation states taking responsibility 
themselves – and protecting their own national borders’ (May 2015, cited in Karamanidou, 
2019), a sentiment echoed in the extract from Orban’s speech. 
However, narratives on the border are also linked to perceptions of solidarity in controlling the 
external border. In Orban’s speech, controlling the external border is linked both to national 
interests but also to an understanding of solidarity as participating in efforts to control the 
borders of the EU. In political discourses in Hungary and Poland in particular, participating in 
such efforts – for example through providing border guards for Frontex in the case of Poland 
and the perception that it protects the EU’s Eastern border – is an expression of solidarity that 
they prefer over schemes such as relocation (Gyollai and Korkut, 2019; Szulecka, 2019).  
Narratives in Greece and Italy evoke instead solidarity to call for EU assistance in controlling 
the external borders of the Union, a theme that predates the migratory movements of 2015: 
[A] system that leaves the individual coastal states of the southern Mediterranean 
alone to manage unilaterally or bilaterally such important issues as illegal 
immigration cannot work […]. (Maroni, 2017, cited in Terlizzi, 2019) 
In particular, my country, due to its enormous coastline and its many islands, lifts 
a disproportionate burden in order to manage the illegal migratory flows that have 
their final destination in central and northern Europe. […] The stifling pressure on 
the eastern and southern borders of the European Union cannot leave any 
European member state indifferent (Hellenic Parliament, 2014, cited in Ilias et. al., 
2019). 
In the post-2015 context, in Greek narratives emphasise that joined efforts in protecting the 
external border are necessary for protecting the character of the European Union. 
Europe will be able to respond effectively to the challenge of managing mixed 
flows only if it does it as a whole, in a coordinated and especially cooperative way 
in terms of true solidarity […] The EU united stance is tested by the national 
interests of the member states that have emerged, in the most cruel way, through 
the security dimension of the refugee crisis. If the Union fails to effectively protect 
the external borders and secure the fair burden sharing among member states, 
the risk of a more comprehensive nationalization of policies will become a reality 
(Ministry of Citizen Protection, 2017, cited in Ilias et. al., 2019). 
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In this regard, the national report on Greece shows that the notion of national sovereignty has 
been changing whereas ‘the migratory-refugee crisis has questioned the notion of territorial 
sovereignty as a structured entity’ and gave way to an Europeanised version appreciating ‘EU 
assistance’ (Ilias et. al., 2019, p. 47).  
EU member states without a significant section of the external border, for example Germany, 
Sweden and Austria articulate the question of solidarity, sovereignty and externalisation in a 
different way. For them the ‘deficiencies at the EU external border’ were not only perceived as 
challenging national security, as e.g. argued in the Swedish government bill for the 
reintroduction of national internal border controls of 2016 and 2019 Borevi and Shakra, 2019, 
14). To them, the question of border control was additionally linked to the phenomena of 
‘secondary movements’. For them, it was one of the main arguments for the repeated 
application of the exemption provisions of the Schengen border code (Art 25, 29) that allow 
for the temporary reintroduction of national border controls (Josipovic and Reger 2019, 25 and 
39). 
Overall the border in the political narratives of most selected countries is conceptualised in the 
narrow sense: as a line of demarcation between states or between the EU and territories 
outside it - there is little to suggest in most countries that the border is conceptualised in the 
sense of a dispersed assemblage of institutions, practices and actors both beyond and within 
the territories of member states and the European Union (Balibar and Swenson, 2004; Yuval–
Davis, Wemyss and Cassidy, 2019; Vollmer, 2017). However, a more holistic understanding 
of border control emerges in particular in Italian and German narratives. On the one hand, 
there is an emphasis on policies of detention and return as part of border management 
(Hänsel, Hess and Kasparek, 2019; Terlizzi, 2019). On the other, Italian and German 
narratives focus on externalisation and cooperation with third countries as essential for 
preventing entry and thus perceived threats from reaching European territories. 
The idea is to fight crime where it arises, where it comes from. At the root, so to speak, 
at the place of origin, if you take the local component now, with the goal that it never 
reaches Germany in the first place. (interview D, cited in Hänsel, Hess and Kasparek, 
2019) 
[T]he external dimension of migration policies is fundamental for the survival of 
Schengen and the principle of free movement. The management of migratory flows is 
no longer sustainable without a targeted and enhanced cooperation with third 
countries, both of origin and transit (Renzi, cited in Terlizzi, 2019) 
3.3 Humanitarianism, Human Rights and Security 
The reports indicate that humanitarian narratives – namely calling for protecting the lives of 
migrants and providing assistance – and human rights discourses are continuously present in 
several selected countries. 	
Some reports suggest that humanitarian and human rights narratives have been if not 
dominant at least as significant in different periods. In Sweden, more liberal tendencies can 
be observed in narratives around increasing rights of refugees and migrants at the beginning 
of the 2010s (Borevi and Shakra, 2019, 11). For instance, at the very beginning of the mass 
migration movements in 2015 German and Swedish authorities called for the public to ‘open 
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your hearts’ (Dagens Nyheter 2014, cited in Borevi and Shakra, 2019), also the Greek Syriza 
government called in 2015 and 2016 for a ‘human security’ approach and declared that 
‘Greece of Humanity stands against the …fences and closed borders’ (Ilias et. al., 2019, p. 
46), while the Italian ministry of the interior still stated in 2017 that ‘it is a moral duty to welcome 
those who flee war, those who flee famine, unaccompanied minors: we will always welcome 
them’ (Minniti 2017, cited in Terlizzi, 2019).  
However, these narratives coexist with narratives of control and as in the Italian case of the 
Mare Nostrum operation shows, go hand in hand (Terlizzi 2019). The following quote by a 
Polish MP exemplifies that providing protection is perceived as a response alongside border 
control, which is constructed as the primary one: 
We tried to solve the problem in a complex manner. We stated clearly: the first 
thing is to strengthen the borders of the European Union. Secondly, there is a need 
to clearly differentiate refugees from economic migrants. If someone comes from 
a relatively safe country, they should be sent to the country of origin. Additionally, 
there must be verification centres. That is why we agreed – provided that this is 
an element of this programme – for one-time, not permanent, relocation of 
thousands of refugees, since such number was adequate for Poland. This is the 
number that we could easily accept, nothing bad would happen in Poland. We 
would be helping people who authentically need this help […] (Trzaskowski, 2016, 
cited in Szulecka, 2019) 
In a similar manner, sea rescue activities in Italy are linked to securitarian aims of preventing 
departure and enhancing returns: 
the […] Italian strategy […] focuses [also] on supporting Libyan authorities 
responsible for border control and flow management. [This strategy] contributes to 
reducing the risk of accidents and shipwrecks, a risk that can only be eliminated 
by stopping departures (Minniti, 2017, cited in Terlizzi, 2019) 
cooperation in border surveillance at sea is absolutely important, together with that 
of repatriation, because it serves to prevent landings, which is always the best 
thing to do since it makes it possible to save human lives (Maroni, cited in Terlizzi, 
2019) 
Such statements should thus be seen as part of the ‘securitarian-humanitarian nexus’. On the 
one hand, narratives reproduce migrants both as lives to be saved as well as to be subjected 
to control (Vaughan-Williams, 2015). On the other, they point to the extent to which 
humanitarian discourses have become interlinked with discourses of the border, especially in 
constructions of a ‘safe’ and ‘secure’ border - and border management (Vollmer, 2017; 
Williams, 2016). 
The connection of human rights standards and border control is much weaker in the narratives 
of the selected countries. The administration and the political apparatus in Germany still 
highlight the significance of adhering to human rights in the context of border management in 
the years following 2015, but indicate that these standards are increasingly seen as an 
obstacle for an effective return policy (Hänsel, Hess and Kasparek, 2019). 
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4. Analysis of findings 
In this section of the report, we will summarise our findings and analyse them in the light of 
the theoretical and conceptual discussion. Our focus lies on the complex multi-level and 
network-like character of the policy field, especially focusing on the complex relations between 
EU and member states and its changing nature and its dynamics. We discuss EU 
externalisation policies towards transit and source countries and which relations and dynamics 
they bring about. Through this approach, we elaborate a critical stance towards 
conceptualisations that perceive this process as top-down. 
4.1 Patterns of Divergence and Convergence in Law and 
Policy 
The legal frameworks on border management and migration controls in EU member states 
are largely harmonised at the level of formal transposition. In addition to the key regulations, 
all selected member states apart from the UK have adopted the relevant directives. While the 
UK selectively adopts instruments on the basis of opt-in arrangements, it has nevertheless 
transposed into domestic law several instruments in the domain of border management and 
migration control. Therefore, while the UK legal framework differs in some respects, there is a 
degree of alignment in areas regulated by EU law, such as visas, carriers’ liability and returns. 
However, as the country reports demonstrate, there is still considerable divergence among 
the legal frameworks of the selected member states. Like in the CEAS, the domain of border 
management and migration controls is not fully harmonised: it still reserves some 
competences for member states, and leaves a degree of leeway for member states to adapt 
EU law during their transposition (den Heijer, Rijpma and Spijkerboer, 2016). To a large extent, 
the differences observed in terms of specific arrangements is attributable to the discretion 
afforded to member states by EU law. For example, Austria, Germany, Greece, Hungary 
and Sweden have all used the derogation powers under article 2(2) of the Return directive, 
have applied grounds for detention that go beyond those referred to in the text of the directive, 
and have entry ban lengths that surpass the recommended maximum of five years. Likewise, 
domestic frameworks differ in the area of facilitation, in particular regarding the transposition 
of humanitarian and financial motivation clauses, and the level of penalties imposed – as is 
the case with penalties within the scope of the Carriers’ liability framework. A further reason 
for the observed divergence is the degree of competence maintained in certain areas by 
member states. As unauthorised entry is not criminalised in EU law, and border areas are in 
some member states excluded from the scope of the Returns directive, it is regulated by 
national law. With the exception of employers’ sanctions, internal migration controls such as 
ID checks under Article 23 of the Schengen’s Border Code are an area of national 
competence. 
The case of legal reforms in Hungary is beyond the scope of divergences outlined above. 
Legal reforms at the domestic level introduced since 2013, and especially in response to the 
migratory movements of that year did not conform to EU instruments, to the point that the 
Commission started two infringement proceedings in 2017, which led to the referral of Hungary 
to the CJEU in 2018, and 2019 (European Commission, 2019). The proceedings focus on a 
number of legal provisions pertaining to border management and control and their implications 
for access to the asylum process. Limited access to the transit zone, the only location where 
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asylum applications could be submitted, constituted a failure to provide access to the asylum 
procedure. In relation to the provisions of the Return Directive, the Commission referred to 
illegal returns to Serbia and that the compulsory containment of asylum seekers in transit 
zones constituted systematic, indefinite detention in violation of the provisions of the Directive 
(European Commission, 2017, 2018, 2019). In addition, Hungarian law failed to guarantee the 
procedural safeguards such as the issuance of individual return decisions and the right to 
appeal stipulated by the Directive and violated both the Return and Reception directives by 
not providing food to detainees (European Commission, 2017, 2018, 2019). 
Overall, legal frameworks of border management and migration control have been harmonised 
by 2015. However, the case of reforms in the field of return policy post-2015 show the need 
to take into account of complex interactions among actors and levels. Increasing returns was 
designated an area of priority in the European agenda on migration, and the Commission 
issued two Action plans in 2015 and 2017. Several of the selected member states changed 
their legal framework to facilitate return (European Migration Network, 2017). One of the 
changes introduced in Germany in 2016, restricting the consideration of health grounds to 
prevent deportation, was included in the Commission’s 2017 Recommendations on Return. 
Following their introduction, Italy raised the minimum detention length from 3 to 6 months and 
Austria the maximum duration of detention to 18 months in line with the recommendations. 
This bidirectional transference of legal measures is also illustrated by the process of recasting 
the Returns directive. The draft text agreed by the Commission and the Council incorporates 
not only some of the Recommendations and content of the 2017 Returns Handbook, but also 
reflects provisions in member states’ legislative frameworks. For example, the extended list of 
criteria on the risk of absconding in the text of the recast directive draws on their definition in 
the national frameworks of member states in line with Article 3 (7) of the 2008 directive and 
relevant practice. Thus, the proposed ‘objective criteria’ include non-compliance with voluntary 
departure, prior criminal offences and opposing the enforcement of return decisions which had 
been already present in the legislation and practice of member states. In a similar vein, the 
recast directive includes a new ground for detention, posing a risk to public policy, public or 
national security, which was already present in the legal frameworks of six of the selected 
states. 
While these findings are not a direct contradiction with the MLG-approach, which is after all 
also interested in how competences or authority is re-allocated in multi-level polities such as 
the EU, the findings point to a new dynamic of competence allocations after 2015 which are 
not uni-directional. Rather, we see a complex interplay between re-nationalising tendencies 
and appeals to supranational harmonisation which will not necessarily result in a clear 
separation of levels, but forms of authority which cut across levels and arrange their respective 
actors in networks, and networks of networks. The most striking example is the construction 
of the European Border and Coast Guard as a network of member state institutions and the 
European agency Frontex, or the aggregation of national and European agencies through the 
hotspot approach. In order to further analyse these emergent forms of border management 
and migration control, a methodological departure from a pure MLG-approach would however 
be necessary. 
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4.2 EU-Externalisation and regional migration and border 
regimes  
The legal framework of Turkey is the most closely aligned with EU legal provisions, which can 
be attributed both to the accession process in general, and the on-going although conflictual 
cooperation in the field of migration control. Specifically, the visa liberalisation process as an 
incentive on behalf of the EU needs to be mentioned here, since it requires wide-ranging and 
particularly technical alignment with the Schengen Acquis and other legal instruments on 
border management and migration control. However, the report on Turkey also clearly 
underlines that policy change in Turkey cannot be reduced to a function of EU expectations, 
in many instances, national interests and regional or geopolitical policy rationales are identified 
which factor into specific policy changes much stronger than EU influence (Gokalp Aras and 
and Şahin Mencütek, 2019; see also Genç, Heck and Hess, 2017).	
The same can be argued in the case of Iraq and Lebanon. Their legal framework pertaining 
to border management and migration control appear to have been influenced to a lesser extent 
by EU externalisation efforts. Some legal developments such as the introduction of the 
Foreigners Residency Law in Iraq in 2017 and Lebanon’s 2012 Partnership agreement 
suggests the influence of the EU, including the partnership agreements signed with the two 
countries and the European Neighbourhood Policy. Yet, the reports also suggest that the 
border management and migration control frameworks and practices are influenced by 
historical legacies and political contexts specific to these countries. Legal arrangements in 
Iraq were shaped by the country’s governance by the Coalition Provisional Authority, since 
many current instruments were introduced during the time it was in power (Warda et al 2019, 
p.13-14). The Coalition Provisional Authority’s orders contain provisions – for example on 
carrier sanctions, entry and visas – are similar to those of the EU legal framework but predate 
the 2012 EU-Iraq Partnership and Cooperation agreement.  
Another feature that highlights the specificities of the three non-EU member states is the 
configuration of actors involved in border management and migration control.  While a trend 
towards civilianisation can be observed in Iraq, it can be attributed to the reforms introduced 
by the Coalition Provisional Authority. As discussed earlier, in Turkey the military not only 
remained a significant actor in border management and migration control, but also expanded 
both its military and humanitarian activities. Further, IGOs and NGOs seem to play a stronger 
role in the implementation of border and migration control policies. In Iraq and Turkey, for 
example, the IOM is heavily involved in capacity building and training (Gokalp Aras and Şahin 
Mencütek, 2019; Warda et al 2019). The UNHCR and domestic NGOs are equally involved in 
activities that combine humanitarian and control dimensions, especially in Turkey and 
Lebanon (Gokalp Aras and and Şahin Mencütek, 2019; Jagarnathsingh, 2019). 
Therefore, while the legal regimes of border management and migration control in Lebanon 
and Iraq present many similarities with those of the EU member states within the scope of this 
report, this cannot be attributed only to the externalisation of EU policies. The argument that 
non-EU states are not passive recipients of EU policies (Trauner and Wolff 2014; Wunderlich 
2012) is certainly true, especially in the case of Turkey. However, the historical and political 
specificities of Iraq and Lebanon in particular suggest that laws policies and practices of border 
management and migration control can be also located both in global and regional regimes of 
mobility and its control. These involve not only state actors -both civilian and military but also 
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international organisations and NGOs which act as a ‘global police of populations’ (Scheel and 
Ratfisch 2014).  
4.3 Comparing EU and non-EU Perspectives: the Porous 
and Always Contested Border versus the ‘Sovereign 
Border’ 
The reports on Turkey, Lebanon and Iraq suggest the porous nature of borders in the region. 
In all three countries, their border(land)s with Syria were spaces of mobility based on social 
ties and labour needs. Despite that these forms of mobility also included armed groups and 
were shaped by political conflicts, the governance of the three countries’ border with Syria 
exemplified an approach to border policing that took mobility as a norm, and that imposed 
regulation of mobility as a reaction to perceived crises or threats. 
Such a perspective is equally applicable to European border and migration policy, even though 
it necessitates a careful excavation of the many sedimented layers of policy. Assuming 
mobility as a norm is exemplified by the core rationale of the Schengen area as an area without 
internal border controls. Even the temporary re-introduction of border controls such as in 
Sweden, Germany, and Austria do not contradict this assessment, since they can equally 
be interpreted as specific policy responses to perceived deviations, here: secondary 
movements of asylum seekers along specific routes. 
But even concerning the Schengen external border, the reports drawn on for this assessment 
outline many instances of regional practices of cross-border mobility that were regulated more 
strongly only over the last twenty years in a process intimately connected with the 
Europeanisation of migration and border policies. Many of the successive restrictions of cross-
border mobility can however also be interpreted as reactions to emergent new practices of 
migration, this holds especially true for countries with a large segment of the external border 
such as Italy, Hungary, Greece, and Poland. However, the territorial constitution of the 
European project through the Schengen Agreements complicates this analysis, since at its 
core, the agreements construct regionally tolerated practices of mobility as a potentially 
negative impact on the entire EU territory, thus triggering EU policies at harmonisation as the 
enforcement of the lowest common denominator. 
Yet, while some forms of mobility are desirable – or tolerated - the country reports point a 
strengthening of the border, defined not only as a territorial demarcation line but as a set of 
governance practices towards ‘unwanted’ migration.  At the discursive level, this is reflected 
in pervasive narratives of security and border that are present in all countries considered in 
our analysis.  The strengthening of the border is exemplified by an array of measures present 
in all countries included in the scope of the report, in all domains of border management and 
migration control. Reinforced controls at the external border incorporate objects such as 
fences and walls in the case of Greece, Hungary, and Turkey, but also the expansion of 
capacities and technologies, including the use of EU databases. The tightening of the border 
and the securitisation of the policy field also entails a new emphasis on return and detention 
policies at the legislative, policy and implementation level. While this trend applies in all cases, 
it is particularly noticeable in Germany, Austria and Sweden, and running parallel to the 
increase of migratory movements since 2015. Similarly, internal control mechanisms such as 
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residence rules and reporting mechanisms – often an understudied aspect of border control 
regimes – have been used to support the expansion of detention and return regimes, 
especially in Germany, Sweden, Austria and the UK. In other cases – notably Turkey and 
Greece – internal controls regulate the internal residence and movement of migrant 
populations. Hungary only allows asylum application in the closed off transit zones where the 
asylum seekers have to stay.  
The range of actors involved in border management and migration control equally suggests 
the expansion of control regimes and increased securitisation. In addition to civilian actors that 
are normally tasked with such responsibilities, the country reports indicate the involvement of 
military and para-military bodies. In some countries, such as Lebanon and Turkey, the army 
is explicitly tasked with controlling migration at the border. Austria and Hungary introduced 
military and para-military units at their border. In the same category, although more decoupled 
from the EU, falls the deployment of NATO vessels in the Aegean (Fernández, 2016). On the 
one hand, this is not a particular surprise, given that borders have long been associated with 
the military and a rationale of territorial defence (Walters 2002). However, it has been an 
explicit rationale of the Schengen Acquis and the accession process to introduce civilian 
organizations to this policy field, illustrated also by a comparable trend in Turkey and Iraq.  
This expansion and strengthening of control regimes also intersect with discourses and 
practices of humanitarianism - and in limited cases of human rights. Greek report shows even 
for the year 2015 that the government ‘adopted liberal attitudes towards migration’, that also 
led to liberalizing and rights enhancing measures like the closure of detention centres (Ilias et 
al., 2019, 12). The Italian report notes an ‘alternation of narratives over humanitarianism and 
securitization of border management and migration control’ (Terlizzi, 2019, 27). Beyond 
narratives, the interlinked nature of humanitarian and border management activities and 
actors. The Turkish military, for example, participated in the construction of camps in North 
Syria, suggesting what Gokalp Aras and and Şahin Mencütek (2019) aptly call a ‘military-
humanitarian nexus’. Actors involved in the surveillance of sea borders, both civilian and 
military, also conduct search and rescue operations, similar to the EU’s operation EUNAVFOR 
MED, later renamed Operation Sophia, in the Mediterranean (Cuttitta, 2018). These cases 
show that humanitarian rationales are not only linked but are intrinsically intertwined with 
discourses and practices of reinforced border control practices. A different manifestation of 
the security-humanitarian nexus concerns the tendency to discipline and criminalize 
humanitarian and human right activities, particular evident in Hungary, that can be interpreted 
as the return of a sovereign state. 	
Yet, the forced migrations of 2015 do not necessarily constitute the ‘watershed moment’ for 
the strengthening of borders as they have often been described. For the case of Lebanon, 
Iraq, and Turkey, this is abundantly clear. The assessment however also holds for the UK 
and Poland, which are not destination countries of the forced migrations of 2015, even though 
policy change was in both cases legitimated through a discourse of a ‘European refugee 
crisis’. Hungary then had already started imposing harsher border management and migration 
control practices before 2015, while both Greece and Italy, incidentally the two countries for 
which the hotspot approach was triggered, also need to be excluded from such a narrative. In 
the case of Italy, the history of a porous and contested border in a European context can be 
traced back at least to the 1990s (Paoli, 2015). Similarly, securitarian-humanitarian narratives 
and practices can be traced back to the first cooperation agreement signed between Italy and 
Libya in 2003 (Terlizzi 2019). For Greece, the overhaul of its entire migration management 
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apparatus then can be traced back to the years 2010/11, thus preceding the arrivals of 2015 
by many years and as strongly outlined in the report on Greece. Indeed, treating Greece as a 
‘terra nullis’ that only appeared on the map of migration policies in 2015 is a serious fallacy 
(Cabot, 2019). 
5. Conclusion 
This report provided a comparative overview of the key findings concerning the governance 
of border management and migration control in the eleven countries of the RESPOND 
consortium. Drawing both on the theoretical frameworks of multilevel governance and other 
theoretical perspectives – critical migration and security studies, border studies – we here 
outline some of the key conclusion that arise from the analysis of the findings. 	
First, we observe a high degree of complexity in terms of legal arrangements and their 
implementation. Even though most of the legal frameworks of EU member states in this project 
– with the partial exception of the UK – are harmonised with the EU acquis in the field of border 
management and migration control, they diverge both at the level of transposition and 
implementation. This is partly due to the leeway provided in EU instruments in what concerns 
their legal transposition, but also to their implementation at the national level. 	
Additionally, reports on Germany, Sweden and Poland have revealed a degree of 
dissatisfaction with the current state of Schengen governance. On the one hand, the continued 
prolongation of nominally temporary Schengen-internal border controls is at odds with the 
overall rationale of the Schengen area as an area without internal border controls. We have 
outlined that these measures do not necessarily translate into a political demand to roll back 
these achievements. However, there are indications that member states feel that Schengen 
governance and rationale are perceived as outdated and need to undergo an update.	
A further level of complexity is added if we take into account the three non-EU countries within 
the scope of this report, where the influence of EU law varies considerably. While Turkey’s 
legal framework is aligned to a greater degree because of the accession and visa liberalisation 
processes, legal arrangements and implementation practices in Lebanon and Iraq are shaped 
to a larger extend by the historical and political contexts of these countries, including legacies 
of colonialism and military interventions, regional conflicts and diffusion of power among 
political authorities and military actors. 
We also observe that the transposition and implementation of legal provisions – international 
and European - and the practices of border management can alter the legal landscape. This 
does not only challenge assumptions about harmonisation, but also raises questions about 
the relation between the governance of borders and human rights. In the European context, 
Hungary is the most extreme example, in that its legal framework and its implementation 
directly contravenes European law and human rights norms. In the case of other countries, 
pushbacks and refusals of entry demonstrate how border management practices inhibit 
access to protection. In a less dramatic but equally significant manner practices of detention 
and regimes of internal controls – such as restriction of movement at the domestic level – have 
expanded, in some cases in response to the 2015 migration movements, in others – notably 
the UK – due to domestic developments. 	
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To this extent, we observe a dominant process of securitization and tightening of borders. This 
trend, which is observed in all eleven countries, is manifested through the reinforcement and 
frequently militarisation of the border and of border control practices and deployment of border 
infrastructures which are reaffirming traditional concepts of the border. The prolonged-
reintroduction of internal border controls by three of the countries – Germany, Sweden and 
Austria – further illustrates the proliferation of borders as a response to the 2015 migratory 
movements in Europe. However, in this context we also observe increased interactions 
between securitarian and humanitarian logics. This is manifested at one level in narratives of 
border management and migration control, whereby discursive securitisation co-exists with 
narratives of humanitarianism – the latter often acting as legitimating devices for the former. 
In terms of policy practices, border surveillance operations, especially at sea, are interlinked 
with search and rescue operations. Military actors in some countries – notably Greece and 
Turkey – are involved in humanitarian activities such as building camps or contributing to their 
operation. Conversely, intergovernmental ‘humanitarian’ actors such as the UNHCR or IOM 
participate in border management practices, for example by registering and screening 
populations.	
The comparative findings also showcase the multiplicity of actors, processes and practices 
involved in the governance of border management and migration controls. While, for example, 
it is assumed that domestic legal provisions and their change are shaped by EU legal 
frameworks and reforms, the process of recasting the Returns directive demonstrates that 
proposed provisions reflect in fact the practices of member states. EU member states engage 
both with EU-wide border management regimes and actors such as Frontex, but also with 
bilateral and trilateral patterns of police cooperation. Further, we see a multiplication of actors 
since 2015, leading to an intensification of hybrid forms of governance. Despite processes of 
civilianisation of border control not only in EU countries but also in Turkey and Iraq, military 
actors are still heavily involved in border surveillance and control, while military-like units 
tasked with border control emerged in different national settings. Responsibilities over the 
governance of borders are dispersed across regional, national and subnational actors, while 
their implementation relies often on non-state actors such as international governmental 
organisations, NGOs and for-profit actors. 
While some versions of the multi-level governance framework assume clearly delineated 
‘levels’ of legal authority and implementation – regional, European, national, local – this runs 
the risk of obscuring interactions across levels. This has less to do with the mere presence of 
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